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1. Abstract	  
Since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2008	  and	  the	  development	  of	  austerity	  as	  a	  
widespread	  economic	  strategy	  there	  has	  been	  continuing	  focus	  on	  the	  tax	  gap	  as	  an	  issue,	  which	  is	  
the	  difference	  between	  the	  amount	  of	  tax	  that	  should,	  theoretically,	  be	  collected	  by	  a	  tax	  authority	  
within	  the	  prevailing	  system	  that	  a	  tax	  jurisdiction	  has	  legislated	  for	  and	  the	  actual	  amount	  of	  tax	  
collected.	  The	  efficiency,	  or	  otherwise,	  of	  a	  tax	  authority	  in	  tackling	  the	  tax	  gap	  has	  come	  to	  be	  seen	  
as	  a	  measure	  of	  its	  effectiveness	  in	  raising	  revenue,	  whether	  to	  balance	  budgets	  or	  fund	  additional	  
government	  spending.	  Despite	  this,	  relatively	  little	  formal	  attention	  has	  been	  given	  to	  technical	  
dimensions	  of	  the	  tax	  gap,	  or	  to	  the	  link	  between	  that	  tax	  gap	  and	  tax	  authority	  spending.	  We	  have	  
sought	  to	  address	  these	  last	  issues.	  In	  the	  process	  we	  have	  appraised	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  data	  
available	  for	  this	  process,	  including	  whether	  available	  GDP	  data	  is	  reliable	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  estimation;	  
whether	  data	  on	  tax	  collected	  is	  comparable	  and	  whether	  available	  data	  on	  tax	  authority	  spending	  is	  
appropriate	  for	  this	  purpose.	  Data	  on	  estimates	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  have	  also	  been	  appraised	  as	  
a	  consequence.	  Whilst	  it	  has	  proved	  possible	  to	  prepare	  new	  estimates	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  for	  EU	  
member	  states	  limitations	  in	  the	  resulting	  estimates	  are	  highlighted.	  In	  addition,	  weaknesses	  in	  all	  
other	  data	  sources	  are	  noted,	  and	  their	  suitability	  is	  questioned.	  The	  resulting	  analysis	  of	  tax	  
authority	  expenditure	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  tax	  gap	  is,	  consequently,	  heavily	  constrained,	  but	  in	  
any	  event	  no	  apparent	  statistical	  association	  is	  noted.	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  other	  approaches	  to	  the	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management	  of	  the	  tax,	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  tax	  authorities,	  are	  required,	  with	  a	  
recommendation	  that	  tax	  spillover	  assessments	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  alternative.	  
	  
2. Introduction	  
The	  fundamental	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  research	  underpinning	  this	  paper	  sought	  to	  test	  is	  that	  there	  
might	  be	  a	  direct	  relationship	  between	  the	  level	  of	  expenditure	  that	  a	  jurisdiction	  commits	  to	  its	  tax	  
authority	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  that	  the	  same	  jurisdiction	  might	  suffer.	  If	  true	  the	  obvious	  
consequence	  would	  be	  that	  governments	  wishing	  to	  collect	  more	  funds	  to	  either	  balance	  their	  	  
budget	  or	  to	  support	  additional	  government	  expenditure	  should	  commit	  greater	  resources	  to	  their	  
tax	  authority.	  Instinctively	  the	  idea	  that	  those	  authorities	  enjoying	  a	  greater	  allocation	  of	  resources	  
should	  suffer	  lower	  marginal	  tax	  yields,	  which	  would,	  however,	  be	  reflected	  in	  a	  reduced	  tax	  gap	  is	  
economically	  appealing	  and	  consistent	  with	  most	  microeconomic	  thinking.	  	  
	  
The	  planned	  work	  did	  require	  that	  there	  be	  relevant,	  reliable,	  consistent,	  comprehensive	  and	  
comparable	  data	  on	  a	  number	  of	  activities	  to	  ensure	  that	  an	  effective	  appraisal	  could	  take	  place.	  
Those	  activities	  included	  measures	  of	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP),	  the	  shadow	  economy,	  or	  non-­‐
observed	  economy	  as	  it	  is	  sometimes	  called	  (NOE),	  tax	  yields	  by	  tax	  and	  the	  allocation	  of	  tax	  
authority	  expenditure	  by	  jurisdiction.	  Information	  on	  the	  number	  of	  taxpayers	  and	  other	  related	  
data	  was	  also	  considered	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  interpretation	  purposes.	  As	  it	  transpired,	  what	  was	  
expected	  to	  be	  a	  relatively	  straightforward	  exercise	  when	  the	  research	  began	  proved	  to	  be	  anything	  
but	  that	  as	  the	  research	  progressed	  as	  successive	  problems	  with	  data	  were	  encountered,	  as	  
recounted	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  
	  
The	  research	  that	  has	  resulted	  from	  this	  work	  does,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  focus	  as	  much	  upon	  the	  
difficulty	  of	  appraising	  national	  income,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  tax	  
collected	  by	  different	  jurisdictions,	  as	  it	  does	  on	  appraising	  how	  tax	  authorities	  use	  the	  resources	  
available	  to	  them.	  This	  was	  not	  the	  research	  output	  that	  was	  anticipated	  when	  commencing	  this	  
work.	  It	  is,	  however,	  suggested	  that	  given	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  issue	  the	  resulting	  work	  does	  
highlight	  a	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  governments	  and	  international	  agencies	  to	  address	  a	  matter	  of	  
considerable	  importance	  within	  both	  national	  accounting	  and	  national	  resource	  allocation	  that	  must	  
be	  corrected	  if	  the	  aim	  of	  improving	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  tax	  collection	  is	  to	  be	  achieved.	  
	  
3. Assessing	  tax	  administrations’	  performance	  	  
	  
The	  primary	  duty	  of	  tax	  administrations	  is	  to	  ensure	  the	  timely	  collection	  of	  tax	  revenues	  owing	  in	  a	  
jurisdiction	  in	  accordance	  with	  prevailing	  tax	  laws	  (OECD	  2017,	  33).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  recent	  trends,	  
however,	  tax	  administrations	  have	  found	  themselves	  in	  a	  double	  bind:	  at	  a	  wider	  level,	  they	  have	  
been	  affected	  by	  the	  secular	  move	  in	  public	  administration	  towards	  ‘new	  public	  management’,	  
which	  brought	  about	  an	  increased	  emphasis	  on	  accountability,	  transparency,	  and	  performance	  
measurement	  (Osborne	  2010),	  while	  at	  the	  operational	  level,	  they	  have	  had	  to	  confront	  cutbacks	  in	  
resources,	  due	  not	  least	  to	  the	  fiscal	  strain	  effected	  by	  recent	  financial	  crisis	  which	  has	  left	  
governments	  with	  escalating	  deficits	  and	  swelling	  debt	  (Alm	  and	  Duncan	  2014).	  As	  a	  result,	  tax	  
authorities	  face	  the	  pressure	  of	  increasing	  their	  revenue	  collection	  efficiency	  precisely	  at	  a	  time	  
when	  they	  are	  not	  only	  bereft	  of	  the	  extra	  resources	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  also	  face	  the	  potential	  loss	  of	  their	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existing	  ones.	  In	  other	  words,	  increasing	  pressure	  has	  been	  building	  up	  for	  tax	  authorities	  to	  do	  
more	  with	  less.	  The	  underlying	  premise	  of	  this	  approach	  is,	  however,	  that	  firstly	  there	  is	  scope	  for	  
tax	  administrations	  to	  step	  up	  their	  game,	  and	  that	  secondly	  the	  determinants	  of	  an	  efficient	  
administration	  are	  known.	  Our	  object	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  test	  these	  linked	  hypotheses.	  	  
	  
In	  practice,	  most	  studies	  assessing	  tax	  authorities	  and	  system	  performance	  do	  not	  focus	  on	  these	  
significant	  and	  important	  administrative	  issues.	  They	  do	  instead	  focus	  on	  external	  determinants	  of	  
taxpayer	  behaviour,	  such	  as	  tax	  compliance	  and	  evasion.	  There	  is,	  for	  example,	  a	  significant	  
literature	  gauging	  the	  extent	  of	  tax	  evasion	  and	  analysing	  the	  potential	  causes	  underlying	  it,	  and	  it	  
generally	  spans	  demographic,	  cultural,	  behavioural,	  legal,	  institutional,	  and	  economic	  reasons	  (Tanzi	  
2017;	  Alm	  2012;	  Slemrod	  2007;	  Sandmo	  2005).	  Despite	  the	  breadth	  of	  these	  studies,	  it	  has	  been	  
reported	  that	  many	  still	  rely	  on	  Schneider	  and	  Enste’s	  (2013,	  2003)	  seminal	  and	  regularly	  updated	  
surveys	  on	  shadow	  economies	  throughout	  the	  world	  (Khlif	  and	  Achek	  2015).	  While	  there	  are	  many	  
merits	  to	  using	  surveys	  as	  a	  methodology	  for	  estimating	  tax	  evasion,	  significant	  limitations	  to	  this	  
approach	  have	  also	  been	  noted,	  especially	  reporting	  bias	  which	  might	  result	  in	  the	  overestimation	  of	  
the	  issue	  (Fuest	  and	  Riedel	  2010).	  
	  
This	  concern	  has	  led	  to	  another	  body	  of	  literature	  on	  ‘tax	  gaps’	  i.e.	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  
theoretical	  amount	  of	  tax	  that	  should	  be	  collected	  by	  a	  tax	  authority	  during	  a	  year	  and	  the	  sum	  that	  
is	  actually	  collected.	  Murphy	  and	  Petersen	  (2018)	  review	  both	  the	  manifold	  uses	  of	  this	  concept	  and	  
the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  has	  been	  employed	  by	  various	  tax	  authorities.	  They	  find	  that	  only	  eleven	  EU	  
tax	  authorities	  prepare	  any	  tax	  gap	  estimates	  of	  their	  own,	  and	  that	  only	  one	  (the	  United	  Kingdom)	  
does	  so	  annually	  for	  all	  major	  taxes.	  There	  is,	  then,	  a	  paucity	  of	  data	  available	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  
issue	  being	  faced	  when	  tackling	  the	  European	  tax	  gap.	  That	  said,	  the	  best	  estimates,	  for	  instance,	  of	  
the	  VAT	  gap	  (which	  is	  the	  tax	  gap	  most	  widely	  covered),	  place	  it	  at	  between	  -­‐1.4%	  (i.e.	  an	  over	  
recovery,	  for	  Sweden)	  and	  37.18%	  (for	  Romania)	  of	  total	  theoretically	  collectable	  of	  VAT	  revenues	  in	  
2015,	  with	  a	  total	  loss	  throughout	  the	  EU	  that	  might	  amount	  to	  €151.5	  billion	  (EC	  DGT	  2017).	  
Murphy	  (2012)	  estimated	  the	  total	  EU	  tax	  gap	  over	  all	  taxes	  to	  be	  €1	  trillion.	  Despite	  slow	  uptake	  
and	  limited	  scope	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  tax	  gap	  measurement	  methods	  will	  become	  a	  standard	  by	  which	  
tax	  administration	  efficiency	  is	  gauged,	  but	  that	  is	  not	  the	  universal	  case	  at	  present.	  	  
	  
What	  these	  studies	  have	  in	  common	  is	  their	  focus	  on	  looking	  at	  ways	  to	  improve	  tax	  collection	  
performance	  by	  addressing	  the	  perceived	  determinants	  of	  tax	  evasion	  and,	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree,	  tax	  
avoidance.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  attempt	  to	  assess	  what	  decisive	  factors	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  
compliance	  with	  taxation	  duties.	  This	  strand	  of	  research	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  1970s,	  and	  is	  reviewed	  in	  
an	  oft-­‐cited	  paper	  authored	  by	  Jackson	  and	  Milliron	  (1986)	  which	  identified	  fourteen	  compliance	  
variables	  most	  commonly	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  studies	  previously	  noted	  in	  this	  paper:	  age,	  gender,	  
education,	  income	  level,	  income	  source,	  occupation,	  peer	  influence,	  ethics,	  fairness,	  complexity,	  
revenue	  authority	  contact,	  sanctions,	  probability	  of	  detection,	  and	  tax	  rates.	  Over	  the	  following	  
decade,	  some	  of	  these	  variables	  received	  increasing	  attention	  (e.g.	  ethics	  and	  income	  level),	  while	  
others	  such	  as	  occupation	  or	  contact	  with	  the	  revenue	  authority	  were	  mostly	  buried.	  But	  even	  
though	  the	  overall	  research	  volume	  increased,	  the	  findings	  regarding	  the	  validity	  or	  predictability	  of	  
some	  of	  these	  variables	  were	  mixed	  (Sawyer	  2001).	  Not	  much	  headway	  was	  made	  during	  this	  time	  in	  
increasing	  the	  confidence	  as	  to	  the	  decisive	  factors	  generating	  compliance	  as	  a	  result.	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Despite	  this,	  many	  subsequent	  studies	  built	  on	  these	  insights,	  and	  there	  is	  now	  a	  burgeoning	  
literature	  on	  the	  multifarious	  dimensions	  that	  influence	  tax	  compliance	  and	  therefore	  tax	  collection.	  
Deterrence	  models	  of	  tax	  evasion,	  for	  instance,	  focus	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  enforcement	  intensity	  and	  tax	  
rate	  levels	  on	  compliance,	  and	  construe	  the	  latter	  as	  a	  product	  of	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	  based	  on	  
the	  risk	  preferences	  of	  the	  taxpayer	  (Sandmo	  2005;	  Slemrod,	  Blumenthal,	  and	  Christian	  2001;	  
Allingham	  and	  Sandmo	  1972).	  Conversely,	  behavioural	  models	  eschew	  the	  rational,	  utility-­‐
maximising	  assumptions	  of	  deterrence	  approaches	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  taxpayer	  (be	  it	  individual	  or	  
business),	  and	  look	  at	  compliance	  as	  a	  more	  multifaceted	  phenomenon.	  For	  example,	  Frey	  (1997)	  
makes	  a	  differentiation	  between	  deterrence	  elements	  such	  as	  harsh	  punishment	  associated	  with	  tax	  
evasion	  laws,	  which	  he	  calls	  extrinsic	  motivation,	  and	  things	  like	  ‘civic	  virtue’,	  which	  constitute	  an	  
intrinsic	  form	  of	  motivation,	  and	  should	  be	  placed	  on	  an	  similar	  footing	  with	  the	  former	  in	  its	  effect	  
on	  compliance.	  It	  might	  even	  be	  the	  case	  that	  sometimes	  intensifying	  extrinsic	  motivation	  is	  
counterproductive	  and	  leads	  to	  less	  compliance	  due	  to	  deteriorating	  intrinsic	  motivation	  (Lubell	  and	  
Scholz	  2001).	  Behavioural	  models	  also	  emphasise	  the	  importance	  of	  perceptions	  in	  compliance	  
decisions.	  Some	  of	  these	  range	  from	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  tax	  system	  itself,	  with	  
perceived	  equitable	  taxation	  leading	  to	  more	  efficient	  tax	  collection	  (Falkinger	  1995),	  to	  the	  
perceived	  morality	  of	  the	  utilisation	  of	  tax	  revenues,	  with	  a	  negative	  perception	  –	  say,	  on	  non-­‐
defensive	  warfare	  –	  leading	  to	  less	  efficient	  tax	  collection	  (Daunton	  1998),	  or	  simply	  the	  professed	  
trust	  in	  government	  –	  more	  trustworthy	  governments	  seem	  to	  be,	  unsurprisingly,	  better	  honoured	  
with	  compliance	  (Torgler	  2003).	  Not	  least,	  an	  important	  factor	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  tax	  evasion	  
itself	  is	  perceived	  as	  a	  socially	  acceptable	  practice	  (Torgler	  2004).	  This	  perception	  varies	  considerably	  
throughout	  the	  world,	  and	  is	  of	  course	  correlated	  with	  the	  size	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  end,	  both	  deterrence	  and	  behavioural	  models	  of	  tax	  evasion	  offer	  insightful	  information	  as	  to	  
how	  to	  increase	  the	  efficiency	  of	  tax	  collection	  but	  it	  remains	  the	  case	  that	  the	  determinants	  in	  
question	  only	  relate	  to	  external	  factors.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  do	  not	  touch	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  tax	  
administration	  in	  the	  efficiency	  of	  tax	  collection.	  To	  some	  extent,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  surprise:	  until	  the	  
second	  half	  of	  the	  new	  millennium,	  data	  on	  the	  administration	  side	  was	  relatively	  scarce	  (Hasseldine	  
2007).	  This	  rendered	  the	  whole	  process	  of	  drawing	  reliable	  conclusions	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  
taxpayer	  behavioural	  change	  on	  overall	  tax	  revenue	  rather	  difficult.	  The	  experimental	  studies	  done	  
at	  the	  individual	  level	  remained	  simply	  indicative	  of	  micro-­‐changes,	  and	  overarching	  or	  systemic	  
conclusions	  stayed	  out	  of	  reach	  (Slemrod	  2016).	  With	  time,	  though,	  tax	  administrations	  started	  
reporting	  state-­‐level	  tax-­‐return	  data,	  and	  this	  equipped	  researchers	  with	  new	  statistical	  evidence	  
upon	  which	  to	  base	  their	  analyses.	  This	  process	  was	  spearheaded	  by	  Nordic	  states	  (Slemrod	  2016),	  
but	  it	  soon	  spread	  to	  other	  developed	  countries,	  and	  it	  was	  not	  long	  before	  international	  
organisations	  jumped	  on	  the	  bandwagon	  and	  started	  releasing	  supranational	  data	  aggregates,	  which	  
would	  take	  the	  tax	  studies	  field	  to	  a	  whole	  new	  level.	  	  
	  
The	  primary	  consequence	  was	  the	  first	  publication	  in	  2004	  of	  the	  OECD	  initiated	  the	  ‘Tax	  
Administration	  Comparative	  Information	  Series’,	  which	  is	  an	  online	  database	  compiling	  information	  
regarding	  various	  aspects	  of	  modern	  tax	  administration	  systems	  and	  includes	  trends,	  innovations,	  
and	  best	  practices.	  Its	  latest	  report	  outlines	  data	  on	  tax	  administrations	  from	  55	  countries,	  and	  
includes	  more	  than	  170	  data	  tables	  and	  more	  than	  100	  examples	  of	  innovation	  and	  practice	  in	  tax	  
administrations	  (OECD	  2017).	  The	  data	  categories	  have	  evolved	  through	  time,	  and	  now	  range	  from	  
types	  of	  revenues	  and	  institutional	  arrangements,	  to	  allocated	  budget	  (on	  things	  like	  salaries,	  IT,	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training),	  human	  resources	  (by	  function,	  gender,	  age,	  number	  of	  offices),	  taxpayer	  segmentation	  (by	  
size,	  type,	  the	  number	  of	  high	  net	  worth	  individuals	  (HNWIs),	  registration,	  returns,	  enforcement,	  
disputes,	  and	  others.	  These	  types	  of	  data	  were	  not	  all	  available	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  data	  
series,	  but	  many	  fundamental	  ones	  have	  been	  produced	  throughout	  its	  history,	  which	  makes	  this	  
database	  amenable	  to	  be	  used	  in	  longitudinal	  analysis.	  Alongside	  it	  sit	  other	  databases	  compiled	  by	  
other	  organisations	  like	  the	  World	  Bank1,	  the	  IMF2,	  and	  EU’s	  Directorate	  General	  for	  Taxation	  and	  
Customs3.	  Nonetheless,	  none	  compare	  to	  the	  OECD’s	  scope	  and	  degree	  of	  detail.	  
	  
That	  being	  said,	  this	  profusion	  of	  data	  has	  not	  delivered	  much	  research	  investigating	  the	  relationship	  
between	  tax	  administration	  capacity	  and	  tax	  collection	  efficiency.	  The	  academic	  literature	  on	  this	  
subject,	  particularly,	  is	  patchy.	  One	  notable	  exception	  is	  the	  output	  of	  TARC	  –	  The	  Tax	  
Administration	  Research	  Centre	  –	  which	  was	  formed	  in	  2013	  as	  a	  partnership	  between	  the	  
University	  of	  Exeter	  and	  the	  Institute	  of	  Fiscal	  Studies	  (a	  UK	  independent	  research	  institute	  founded	  
in	  1969),	  which	  centre	  has	  the	  explicit	  remit	  to	  undertake	  academic	  research	  on	  tax	  administrations	  
with	  a	  focus	  on	  of	  tax	  operations	  and	  policies.	  TARC	  is	  thus	  devoted	  to	  five	  research	  strands:	  
understanding	  tax	  compliance,	  understanding	  tax	  behaviour,	  measuring	  the	  tax	  gap,	  understanding	  
audit	  effects,	  and	  computable	  general	  equilibrium	  modelling4.	  Some	  research	  findings	  include	  the	  
fact	  that	  taxpayer	  compliance	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  pre-­‐population	  of	  tax	  forms	  with	  incorrect	  values	  
(Fonseca	  and	  Grimshaw	  2015);	  that	  social	  norms	  campaigns	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  improving	  
compliance	  (Onu	  and	  Oats	  2014);	  that	  audits	  can	  have	  a	  long-­‐lasting	  impact	  on	  reported	  tax	  liability,	  
reaching	  26	  per	  cent	  by	  the	  fourth	  year	  (Advani,	  Elming,	  and	  Shaw	  2015);	  and	  that	  superseding	  
output-­‐based	  performance	  measurements	  in	  tax	  administration	  and	  replacing	  them	  with	  outcome-­‐
based	  ones	  is	  not	  without	  its	  own	  negative	  ramifications	  (Boll	  and	  Oats	  2014).	  The	  ongoing	  work	  that	  
TARC	  undertakes	  is	  no	  doubt	  important	  for	  advancing	  and	  promoting	  the	  field	  of	  tax	  administration	  
research,	  but	  as	  the	  noted	  descriptions	  of	  it	  its	  work	  make	  clear,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  deal	  with	  
determinants	  of	  tax	  compliance	  on	  the	  tax	  administration	  side,	  instead	  focussing,	  like	  the	  earlier	  
work	  on	  improving	  tax	  efficiency,	  on	  external	  determinants	  of	  compliance.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  researchers	  who	  have	  engaged	  with	  this	  issue.	  	  For	  example,	  John	  Hasseldine,	  
who	  is	  a	  professor	  at	  the	  University	  of	  New	  Hampshire,	  and	  who	  he	  was	  a	  contributor	  to	  the	  
Mirrlees	  Review	  of	  the	  UK	  tax	  system,	  suggested	  in	  the	  course	  of	  that	  review	  that	  the	  UK	  tax	  system	  
was	  ripe	  for	  modernisation	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  the	  UK’s	  economic	  performance	  and	  improve	  living	  
standards	  (Mirrlees	  2010).	  While	  initially	  conventionally	  concerned	  with	  deterrence	  and	  behavioural	  
models	  of	  compliance,	  Hasseldine	  then	  investigated	  so-­‐called	  ‘best-­‐practices’	  in	  tax	  administrations	  
(2007,	  2010),	  which	  had	  to	  do	  with	  the	  internal	  management	  of	  running	  a	  tax	  agency.	  Issues	  he	  
addressed	  included	  strategy	  and	  policy	  formation;	  planning,	  budgeting,	  resource	  allocation;	  
monitoring	  and	  evaluation;	  co-­‐ordination;	  and	  the	  management	  of	  finance,	  personnel,	  information	  
technology	  and	  assets.	  He	  disappointingly	  concluded	  that	  there	  is	  not	  sufficient	  evidence	  as	  to	  what	  
constitutes	  best	  practice	  in	  tax	  administration,	  and	  this	  is	  reinforced	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  academic	  research	  
in	  the	  field	  (2010).	  There	  was,	  however,	  reason	  for	  optimism	  in	  his	  opinion	  given	  that	  tax	  







administrations	  had	  begun	  information	  sharing	  on	  these	  issue.	  	  Despite	  this	  Hasseldine	  later	  argued	  
that	  	  even	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  new	  methodologies	  for	  calculating	  tax	  gaps,	  if	  one	  does	  not	  take	  into	  
account	  behavioural	  responses,	  then	  non-­‐compliance	  will	  be	  exaggerated	  and	  attempts	  to	  address	  it	  
will	  likely	  lead	  to	  worse	  rather	  than	  better	  outcomes	  for	  tax	  revenue	  because	  it	  will	  produce	  tax	  
base-­‐reducing	  effects	  (Gemmell	  and	  Hasseldine	  2014).	  It	  seems	  the	  quest	  for	  identifying	  best	  
practices	  in	  tax	  administration,	  at	  least	  independent	  of	  external	  determinants,	  is	  an	  inconclusive	  
one.	  
	  
James	  Alm	  and	  Denvil	  Duncan	  have	  addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  tax	  administration	  more	  recently	  than	  
Hasseldine	  	  (2014).	  After	  noting,	  unsurprisingly,	  that	  there	  has	  been	  little	  research	  on	  the	  topic,	  Alm	  
and	  Duncan	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  subject	  for	  research,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  new	  
data	  made	  available	  by	  the	  OECD	  in	  its	  data	  series	  on	  tax	  administration	  (OECD	  2017).	  By	  utilising	  
this	  resource,	  the	  relationship	  between	  administrative	  inputs	  (like	  personnel,	  equipment,	  and	  
information)	  and	  outputs	  (i.e.	  revenues)	  can	  be	  associated.	  To	  investigate	  this	  linkage	  they	  
constructed	  a	  three-­‐step	  method	  that	  combined	  data	  envelopment	  analysis	  and	  stochastic	  frontier	  
analysis	  to	  determine	  efficiency	  scores.	  The	  parameters	  they	  employed	  as	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  were	  
salary	  and	  IT	  costs	  for	  the	  former	  and	  total	  tax	  revenues	  and	  a	  tax	  type	  breakdown	  for	  the	  latter.	  
What	  they	  found	  was	  that	  “13	  of	  the	  28	  countries	  are	  relatively	  efficient	  at	  collecting	  any	  of	  the	  
three	  types	  of	  tax	  revenues”	  and	  that	  “on	  average,	  countries	  should	  be	  able	  to	  collect	  their	  current	  
level	  of	  revenues	  with	  approximately	  10–16	  percent	  less	  inputs”	  (2014,	  94).	  In	  other	  words,	  OECD	  
countries	  sport	  an	  average	  performance	  that	  is	  high	  but	  not	  impressive	  in	  a	  context	  that	  includes	  
non-­‐OECD	  countries.	  Alm	  and	  Duncan’s	  study	  is	  thus	  concerned	  strictly	  with	  measuring	  the	  relative	  
overall	  efficiency	  of	  OECD	  tax	  agencies	  based	  on	  their	  adopted	  method,	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  
weight	  of	  particular	  factors	  in	  tax	  administration	  is	  undetermined.	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  no	  other	  
scholars	  developed	  this	  issue	  further.	  	  
	  
To	  conclude	  this	  review,	  research	  on	  tax	  administration	  has	  mostly	  focused	  on	  external	  
determinants	  of	  tax	  performance,	  with	  the	  old	  deterrence	  and	  behavioural	  models	  still	  constituting	  
the	  basis	  for	  studying	  tax	  evasion/compliance.	  The	  extensive	  data	  on	  tax	  administration	  compiled	  by	  
international	  organisations	  like	  the	  OECD	  has	  so	  far	  failed	  to	  produce	  as	  much	  academic	  research	  as	  
warranted	  by	  the	  flurry	  of	  information.	  Despite	  the	  few	  studies	  that	  do	  grapple	  with	  internal	  
determinants	  of	  tax	  collection	  efficiency,	  this,	  so	  far,	  constitutes	  a	  missed	  opportunity.	  It	  is	  this	  
shortfall	  that	  we	  seek	  to	  address.	  	  
	  
4. Methodology	  	  
	  
It	  is	  our	  argument	  that	  assessing	  the	  efficiency	  of	  a	  tax	  administration	  is	  a	  more	  broadly	  based,	  and	  
so	  complex,	  issue	  than	  most	  literature	  published	  on	  this	  issue	  has	  suggested	  to	  date.	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  
important	  that	  at	  a	  microeconomic	  level	  an	  appraisal	  of	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  the	  resources	  allocated	  
to	  a	  tax	  authority	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  collecting	  legally	  due	  tax	  revenues	  be	  undertaken	  so	  that	  the	  
management	  of	  that	  authority,	  and	  those	  supervising	  them,	  can	  be	  assured	  that	  tax	  revenue	  is	  being	  
maximised	  within	  an	  expenditure	  constraint.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  taxation	  within	  
the	  macroeconomy.	  Murphy	  (2015)	  has	  argued	  that	  taxation	  has	  a	  much	  broader	  purpose,	  including	  
redistribution	  of	  income	  and	  wealth;	  repricing	  market	  failure;	  reorganising	  the	  economy	  through	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fiscal	  policy;	  the	  control	  of	  inflation	  by	  withdrawing	  money	  from	  circulation;	  providing	  money	  with	  
value	  in	  exchange	  because	  of	  the	  requirement	  that	  it	  be	  used	  in	  settlement	  of	  taxation	  liabilities	  
which	  then	  requires	  its	  use	  for	  other	  purposes,	  and	  in	  encouraging	  people	  to	  vote	  in	  democracies	  by	  
engaging	  them	  with	  issues	  inherent	  in	  the	  social	  contract	  between	  taxpayers	  and	  the	  state.	  The	  first	  
four	  of	  these,	  at	  least,	  are	  quite	  widely	  agreed	  upon.	  This	  does,	  then,	  imply	  that	  the	  review	  of	  
efficiency	  of	  tax	  administrations	  has	  to	  be	  considered	  within	  the	  context	  of	  macroeconomic	  policy,	  
as	  well	  as	  at	  the	  microeconomic	  level	  which	  has	  been,	  albeit	  rarely,	  the	  focus	  of	  attention	  to	  date.	  	  
	  
The	  methodology	  that	  we	  use	  in	  this	  paper	  proceeds	  through	  a	  number	  of	  logical	  stages	  that	  relate	  
the	  approach	  to	  the	  work	  that	  we	  have	  used	  and	  the	  issues	  that	  have	  arisen	  when	  doing	  so.	  Given	  
that	  our	  approach	  is	  primarily	  intended	  to	  appraise	  the	  efficiency	  of	  tax	  authorities	  within	  a	  
macroeconomic	  context	  we	  start	  with	  a	  consideration	  of	  data	  availability	  for	  this	  purpose	  at	  this	  
level	  and	  as	  a	  result	  consider	  how	  tax	  fits	  into	  measures	  of	  GDP.	  This,	  almost	  inevitably,	  leads	  to	  a	  
consideration	  of	  how	  the	  shadow	  or	  non-­‐observed	  economy	  fits	  into	  such	  measures.	  Our	  intention	  
in	  undertaking	  this	  review	  is	  to	  appraise	  whether	  or	  not	  measures	  of	  tax	  authority	  efficiency	  as	  
indicated	  by	  revenue	  raised	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  GDP	  and	  revenue	  lost	  to	  the	  shadow	  economy	  stated	  
as	  a	  proportion	  of	  GDP	  can	  really	  be	  considered	  useful	  and	  to	  suggest	  what	  might	  need	  to	  be	  done	  
to	  improve	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  measures.	  This	  then	  leads	  to	  an	  appraisal	  of	  available	  data	  on	  
tax	  collected,	  because	  without	  this	  information	  any	  analysis	  of	  tax	  authority	  effectiveness	  is	  not	  
possible.	  Thereafter	  our	  primary	  concern	  is	  with	  data	  availability	  on	  particular	  taxes	  and	  the	  
resources	  allocated	  to	  their	  collection	  to	  determine	  whether	  effective	  comparison	  of	  tax	  authorities	  
at	  this	  level	  is	  possible.	  At	  this	  juncture	  the	  macro	  and	  micro	  analyses	  of	  tax	  authority	  efficiency	  
coincide.	  
	  
5. Tax	  and	  the	  macroeconomy	  
	  
This	  approach	  does	  require	  an	  understanding	  of	  where	  and	  how	  the	  tax	  base	  fits	  into	  the	  
macroeconomy.	  The	  figures	  that	  follow	  seek	  to	  represent	  this:	  
	  





The	  macroeconomy	  is	  the	  bold	  outlined	  area	  (A	  +	  B	  +	  C	  +	  E	  +	  F).	  
	  
GDP	  is	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  macroeconomy	  (B	  +	  C)	  plus	  some	  transactions	  the	  value	  of	  which	  are	  
estimated	  and	  included	  in	  GDP	  but	  which	  are	  representative	  of	  values	  of	  self	  consumption	  but	  which	  
do	  not	  as	  such	  represent	  transactions	  that	  can	  actually	  be	  observed	  within	  the	  actual	  economy	  (D).	  
The	  obvious	  example	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  annual	  value	  of	  an	  owner-­‐occupier	  living	  in	  their	  own	  
house	  being	  included	  in	  GDP	  as	  if	  rent	  was	  paid	  when	  this	  is	  not	  actually	  the	  case.	  	  
	  
It	  will	  be	  noted	  that	  GDP	  estimates	  usually	  include	  an	  estimate	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  represent	  the	  
shadow	  economy	  (B).	  However,	  as	  we	  note,	  this	  will	  in	  most	  cases	  be	  an	  under-­‐estimate	  meaning	  
that	  it	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  a	  part	  of	  the	  non-­‐observed	  economy	  (A)	  will	  exist	  outside	  the	  measure	  for	  
GDP.	  	  
	  
As	  importantly,	  there	  are	  transactions	  within	  the	  economy	  that	  do	  not	  get	  recorded	  in	  GDP.	  By	  far	  
the	  largest	  part	  of	  these	  transactions	  is	  work	  done	  within	  the	  household	  without	  motive	  for	  financial	  
reward	  and	  without	  monetary	  exchange	  taking	  place,	  meaning	  that	  these	  transactions	  are	  always	  
hard	  to	  detect.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  they	  do	  not	  exist.	  GDP	  simply	  fails	  to	  record	  them,	  
but	  they	  take	  place	  in	  every	  economy.	  Almost	  by	  definition	  they	  are	  untaxed.	  There	  are,	  however,	  
other	  transactions	  within	  the	  economy	  that	  are	  correctly	  not	  within	  GDP	  but	  which	  are	  taxable.	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Obvious	  examples	  are	  capital	  gains:	  these	  are	  profits	  arising	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  assets	  that	  do	  not	  add	  
value	  to	  the	  economy	  but	  clearly	  do	  to	  the	  individuals	  who	  enjoy	  them.	  As	  a	  result	  many	  
jurisdictions	  seek	  to	  tax	  them.	  	  
	  
That	  said,	  if	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  economy	  being	  taken	  here	  is	  based	  on	  the	  income	  statement	  (and	  
it	  must	  be,	  since	  GDP	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  income)	  then	  there	  are	  also	  other	  transactions	  that	  are	  not	  
within	  the	  economy	  at	  all	  when	  viewed	  from	  this	  perspective,	  and	  so	  not	  within	  GDP	  by	  default.	  
These	  are	  added	  to	  diagram	  in	  Figure	  1	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Figure	  2	  –	  GDP,	  the	  macroeconomy	  and	  the	  tax	  base	  
	  
Each	  of	  the	  areas	  A	  to	  F	  has	  the	  meaning	  as	  in	  Figure	  1.	  These	  additional	  transactions	  which	  can	  be	  
subject	  to	  tax	  but	  which	  cannot	  be	  measured	  by	  GDP	  or	  any	  income	  based	  approach	  usually	  refer	  to	  
balance	  sheet	  issues.	  So,	  for	  example,	  the	  taxation	  of	  wealth	  in	  its	  own	  right	  falls	  into	  this	  category.	  
So	  too	  does	  a	  charge	  on	  the	  depletion	  of	  natural	  resources	  fall	  into	  this	  description	  of	  a	  tax	  base.	  Gift	  
taxes	  also	  do	  so.	  All	  these	  relate	  to	  charges	  arising	  from	  the	  ownership,	  use	  or	  transfer	  of	  ownership	  
of	  what	  are,	  in	  effect,	  balance	  sheet	  assets.	  They	  are	  as	  such	  a	  completely	  valid	  tax	  base	  that	  falls	  
outside	  all	  measures	  of	  taxable	  capacity	  based	  on	  GDP.	  	  
	  
These	  points	  being	  noted	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  the	  tax	  gap	  is	  represented	  by	  areas	  A	  +	  B	  +	  E	  +	  G.	  The	  
sum	  of	  these	  areas	  might	  represent	  the	  unobserved	  value	  of	  tax	  bases	  in	  a	  period,	  but	  because	  a	  tax	  
base	  is	  unobserved	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  tax	  gap	  of	  similar	  value.	  As	  Murphy	  and	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Petersen	  (2018)	  have	  argued,	  there	  are	  five	  tiers	  of	  tax	  gap.	  Their	  logic	  assumes	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  
that	  all	  available	  tax	  bases	  are	  capable	  of	  taxation	  by	  default	  at	  a	  single	  standard	  tax	  rate	  (which	  
need	  not	  be	  the	  same	  for	  each	  tax	  base)	  without	  any	  deduction	  for	  allowances,	  reliefs	  and	  
exemptions.	  The	  five	  resulting	  tiers	  of	  tax	  gap	  are	  as	  follows:	  
	  
1. Tax	  voluntarily	  foregone	  i.e.	  those	  tax	  bases	  that	  a	  government	  of	  a	  jurisdiction	  chooses	  not	  to	  
tax	  for	  its	  own	  reasons.	  Wealth	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  untaxed	  tax	  base	  in	  many	  jurisdictions,	  but	  in	  
other	  countries	  untaxed	  bases	  include	  capital	  gains,	  gifts	  and	  even	  income,	  whether	  recorded	  
personally	  or	  by	  corporations.	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  no	  compulsion	  on	  any	  country	  to	  tax	  if	  it	  does	  
not	  wish	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  that	  decision	  has	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  a	  cost:	  this	  tax	  gap	  records	  the	  cost	  
of	  the	  decision	  not	  to	  tax	  at	  a	  representative	  tax	  rate;	  
	  	  
2. Tax	  spends	  i.e.	  the	  cost	  of	  tax	  foregone	  from	  tax	  bases	  where	  the	  decision	  to	  tax	  has	  been	  made	  
in	  principle	  but	  where	  allowances,	  reliefs,	  exemptions	  and	  other	  arrangements	  that	  have	  been	  
officially	  sanctioned	  mean	  that	  the	  anticipated	  tax	  revenue	  due	  from	  the	  tax	  base	  is	  not	  
collected	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  positive	  decision	  by	  the	  government	  of	  the	  jurisdiction	  in	  question	  not	  
to	  do	  so.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  not	  all	  items	  caught	  by	  this	  measure	  need	  be	  a	  cost:	  if	  the	  
measure	  is	  determined	  by	  variation	  from	  a	  standard	  tax	  rate	  then	  charges	  made	  at	  higher	  rates	  
are	  recorded	  as	  negative	  tax	  gaps,	  or	  excess	  recoveries;	  
	  
3. Tax	  evaded.	  This	  is	  tax	  due	  on	  those	  parts	  of	  tax	  bases	  that	  have	  been	  deliberately	  moved	  into	  
the	  non-­‐observed	  economy	  to	  avoid	  a	  tax	  charge.	  It	  can	  also	  include	  the	  cost	  of	  fraudulent	  claim	  
for	  tax	  deductions,	  whether	  of	  false	  expenses	  or	  of	  allowances,	  reliefs	  and	  exemptions	  not	  due.	  
It	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  case	  that	  this	  relates	  to	  activity	  in	  areas	  A,	  B,	  E	  and	  G	  in	  Figure	  2.	  
	  
4. Tax	  avoided.	  This	  is	  tax	  not	  paid	  because	  whilst	  the	  economic	  activity	  to	  which	  it	  relates	  is	  within	  
the	  recorded	  economy	  (and	  so	  within	  C,	  F	  or	  H)	  the	  transaction	  has	  been	  deliberately	  
constructed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  a	  tax	  charge	  anticipated	  by	  those	  who	  legislated	  does	  not	  
become	  due.	  There	  are	  numerous	  reasons	  why	  this	  might	  arise:	  significant	  numbers	  of	  people	  
within	  the	  accountancy	  and	  legal	  professions	  appeared	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  facilitating	  such	  
arrangements;	  
	  
5. Unpaid	  tax.	  This	  is	  tax	  declared	  as	  a	  due	  by	  a	  taxpayer	  but	  then	  not	  collected	  by	  a	  tax	  authority	  
when	  the	  sum	  becomes	  liable	  for	  settlement.	  Most	  commonly	  this	  is	  because	  of	  taxpayer	  default	  
due	  to	  bankruptcy	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  the	  result	  of	  administrative	  and	  other	  errors	  by	  the	  tax	  
authority.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  only	  a	  tax	  authority	  can	  appropriately	  appraise	  this	  tier	  of	  the	  tax	  gap.	  
The	  result	  of	  applying	  this	  logic	  to	  just	  one	  part	  (area	  C,	  or	  the	  observed	  economy	  within	  GDP)	  of	  
Figure	  2	  is	  as	  follows:	  
	  





The	  representation	  here	  is,	  of	  course,	  symbolic,	  but	  it	  is	  intended	  to	  make	  three	  issues	  clear.	  The	  
first	  is	  that	  because	  the	  tier	  1	  and	  tier	  2	  tax	  gaps	  are	  within	  the	  control	  of	  a	  government	  they	  have	  
much	  more	  control	  over	  tax	  revenues	  than	  is	  commonly	  thought.	  Together	  these	  two	  tiers	  of	  the	  tax	  
gap	  are	  usually	  described	  as	  the	  ‘tax	  policy	  gap’.	  Secondly,	  tiers	  three	  four	  and	  five	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  are	  
collectively	  called	  the	  tax	  compliance	  gap.	  These	  are	  the	  only	  parts	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  where	  it	  is	  
appropriate	  to	  consider	  questions	  of	  the	  efficiency	  of	  a	  tax	  authority.	  Thirdly,	  and	  as	  this	  analysis	  is	  
intended	  to	  make	  clear,	  even	  then	  the	  consideration	  to	  be	  used	  should	  be	  macroeconomic,	  at	  least	  
in	  overview.	  
	  
At	  this	  macroeconomic	  level	  assessment	  of	  the	  efficiency	  of	  a	  tax	  administration	  does	  then	  requires	  
the	  collection	  of	  data	  on	  six	  essential	  key	  variables.	  These	  are:	  
	  
1. total	  tax	  yield	  (ideally	  but	  not	  vitally	  broken	  down	  by	  tax);	  	  
	  
2. GDP	  (A	  +	  B+C	  in	  figure	  1);	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3. the	  share	  of	  the	  non-­‐observed	  economy	  included	  in	  that	  estimate	  of	  GDP	  (B	  in	  figure	  1);	  	  
	  
4. the	  size	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  in	  proportion	  to	  GDP	  (A	  in	  figure	  1);	  	  
	  
5. the	  cost	  of	  labour	  engaged	  to	  collect	  the	  revenues	  raised,	  and	  	  
	  
6. the	  overhead	  costs	  of	  the	  tax	  administration.	  	  
	  
This	  data	  might,	  if	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  appropriate	  quality,	  be	  used	  for	  four	  purposes.	  The	  
first	  is	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  tax	  authority’s	  ability	  to	  raise	  revenue	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  GDP.	  
The	  second	  is	  to	  appraise	  its	  ability	  to	  control	  the	  shadow	  economy,	  which	  is	  that	  non-­‐
observed	  activity	  motivated	  by	  the	  intention	  to	  evade	  regulation	  various	  forms,	  all	  of	  which	  
will	  result	  in	  non-­‐payment	  of	  tax	  (Schneider	  et	  al	  2010,	  5).	  Thirdly,	  it	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  
should	  be	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  tax	  authority	  to	  deliver	  upon	  the	  government's	  revenue	  
projections	  as	  part	  of	  its	  overall	  macroeconomic	  policy.	  And	  only	  fourthly	  might	  it	  be	  
considered	  appropriate	  to	  appraise	  the	  cost	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  tax	  authority	  in	  fulfilling	  
these	  other	  objectives.	  It	  is	  effectiveness	  against	  the	  achievement	  of	  these	  varied	  objectives	  
that	  we	  have	  sought	  to	  appraise	  when	  undertaking	  this	  work.	  	  
	  
This	  then	  leaves	  three	  further	  issues	  to	  consider.	  The	  first	  is	  whether	  nationally	  reported	  
GDP	  can	  appropriately	  be	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  calculation,	  or	  whether	  it	  should	  be	  
grossed	  up	  for	  the	  estimate	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  that	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  that	  
figure	  for	  the	  reasons	  noted	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  second	  is	  whether	  the	  aggregate	  tax	  rate	  
based	  on	  reported	  GDP	  is	  to	  be	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  extrapolation	  of	  the	  tax	  lost	  to	  the	  
shadow	  economy	  or	  whether	  some	  other	  sum	  should	  be	  used	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  
issues	  noted	  later	  in	  this	  paper.	  The	  third,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  important,	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  
there	  is	  in	  fact	  any	  aggregate	  tax	  loss	  at	  all	  because	  a	  government	  does	  not	  collect	  tax	  for	  
its	  own	  sake	  but	  does,	  instead,	  do	  so	  to	  collect	  a	  targeted	  sum	  that	  achieves	  its	  overall	  fiscal	  
goal,	  which	  will	  usually	  be	  related	  to	  its	  planned	  surplus	  or	  deficit.	  In	  other	  words,	  whatever	  
the	  result	  of	  the	  first	  two	  deliberations	  the	  question	  has	  to	  be	  asked	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  loss	  
that	  can	  be	  calculated	  is	  meaningful	  at	  a	  macroeconomic	  level	  because	  if	  all	  illicit	  financial	  
flows	  which	  are	  at	  present	  untaxed	  were	  identified,	  and	  brought	  within	  the	  tax	  base,	  the	  
realistic	  possibility	  exists	  that	  the	  overall	  tax	  yield	  might	  remain	  unchanged.	  	  
	  
This	  last	  point	  is	  explored	  using	  figures	  4	  and	  5:	  
	  





In	  this	  stylised	  presentation	  of	  tax	  revenue	  collection	  the	  sum	  collected	  (X	  +	  Y)	  is	  the	  tax	  base	  in	  the	  
recorded	  economy	  multiplied	  by	  tax	  rate	  A	  to	  produce	  an	  overall	  yield.	  The	  tax	  gap	  is	  represented	  by	  
the	  tax	  base	  in	  the	  non-­‐recorded	  economy	  multiplied	  by	  tax	  rate	  A,	  and	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  area	  Z.	  
	  
In	  figure	  5	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  there	  is	  no	  activity	  in	  what	  was	  previously	  the	  non-­‐recorded	  economy,	  
all	  of	  which	  is	  now	  transparent	  and	  so	  subject	  to	  tax:	  
	  




The	  size	  of	  the	  recorded	  economy	  has	  now	  expanded.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  
the	  overall	  size	  of	  the	  actual	  economy	  has	  changed.	  	  As	  a	  result	  there	  is	  also	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  
that	  the	  overall	  tax	  yield	  that	  the	  government	  might	  plan	  has	  changed.	  That	  is	  because	  with	  no	  
change	  in	  overall	  economic	  activity	  there	  is	  no	  necessary	  reason	  for	  the	  government	  to	  spend	  more	  
or	  less,	  and	  therefore	  to	  change	  its	  tax	  plans	  simply	  because	  more	  revenue	  is	  potentially	  available.	  
The	  consequence	  might	  then	  be	  that	  a	  government	  in	  this	  fortunate	  situation	  would	  decide	  to	  not	  
increase	  its	  total	  tax	  revenues	  but	  might	  instead	  reduced	  the	  tax	  rate	  from	  A	  to	  B,	  as	  figure	  5	  
indicates,	  with	  those	  in	  what	  was	  previously	  the	  unrecorded	  economy	  now	  making	  a	  tax	  
contribution	  of	  W,	  which	  happens	  in	  this	  stylised	  presentation	  to	  equal	  the	  amount	  uncollected	  
noted	  as	  Z	  in	  figure	  4.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  this	  representation:	  
	  








X	  =	  Z	  
	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  tax	  gap	  is	  not	  foregone,	  but	  what	  actually	  happens	  is	  that	  the	  tax	  not	  paid	  by	  
those	  in	  the	  illicit	  economy	  is	  instead	  made	  good	  by	  an	  excess	  charge	  on	  those	  in	  the	  recorded	  
economy	  who	  are	  tax	  compliant.	  The	  tax	  gap,	  seen	  in	  this	  way,	  is	  not	  then	  an	  issue	  of	  lost	  revenue;	  it	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is	  instead	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  inequality	  created	  by	  those	  who	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  requirements	  
of	  the	  tax	  code.	  It	  is	  stressed:	  this	  is	  not	  to	  belittle	  the	  issue;	  rather	  it	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  
consequences	  of	  tackling	  the	  tax	  gap	  a	  greater	  the	  micro	  economic	  efficiency,	  or	  even	  
macroeconomic	  possibility.	  Tackling	  the	  tax	  gap	  is	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  significance	  for	  those	  with	  
concern	  about	  social	  and	  economic	  justice.	  
	  
Of	  course,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  position	  represented	  in	  figure	  4	  to	  that	  in	  figure	  5	  
would	  actually	  take	  place	  in	  any	  real	  economy:	  the	  chance	  that	  all	  economic	  activity	  will	  become	  
observable	  is	  remote	  in	  any	  jurisdiction,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  remove	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  explanation.	  
That	  relevance	  is	  that	  if	  the	  illicit	  economy	  can	  be	  stated	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  existing	  GDP,	  
assuming	  that	  stated	  GDP	  includes	  little	  or	  no	  estimate	  of	  that	  illicit	  activity,	  then	  when	  multiplied	  at	  
the	  prevailing	  tax	  rate	  the	  estimated	  tax	  revenue	  foregone	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  that	  part	  of	  the	  
economy	  not	  being	  recorded	  can	  be	  estimated,	  and	  is	  equivalent	  to	  Z	  in	  figure	  4.	  This	  then	  answers	  
the	  first	  two	  points	  noted:	  knowing	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  illicit	  economy	  included	  in	  GDP	  is	  only	  of	  
significance	  if	  that	  proportion	  (B	  in	  figure	  1)	  is	  itself	  significant.	  If	  it	  is	  not	  then	  if	  tax	  collected	  within	  
the	  jurisdiction	  is	  appropriately	  stated,	  and	  recorded	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  GDP,	  a	  useful	  estimate	  of	  the	  
tax	  gap	  can	  be	  prepared	  from	  these	  sources	  alone.	  	  
	  
What	  does	  also	  need	  to	  be	  stressed	  is	  what	  the	  term	  ‘useful’	  means	  in	  this	  context.	  It	  is	  suggested	  
for	  this	  purpose	  that	  useful	  data	  has	  the	  qualities	  of	  being	  relevant,	  reliable,	  comprehensive	  in	  terms	  
of	  types	  of	  data	  covered,	  complete	  as	  to	  availability	  of	  data	  for	  those	  sources,	  comprehensible	  in	  
isolation	  and	  comparable	  over	  time	  and	  with	  other	  not	  dissimilar	  analyses.	  Each	  of	  these	  qualities	  is	  
defined	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  use	  that	  is	  to	  be	  made	  of	  the	  information.	  That	  begs	  the	  question	  as	  to	  
what	  use	  might	  be	  made	  of	  tax	  gap	  data.	  On	  this	  issue	  the	  UK’s	  tax	  authority	  say	  “The	  tax	  gap	  
provides	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  understanding	  the	  relative	  size	  and	  nature	  of	  non-­‐compliance.	  ….	  [I]t	  
provides	  a	  foundation	  for	  HMRC’s	  strategy.	  Thinking	  about	  the	  tax	  gap	  helps	  the	  department	  to	  
understand	  how	  non-­‐compliance	  occurs	  and	  how	  HMRC	  can	  address	  the	  causes.”	  (HMRC	  2018,	  3).	  
This	  is	  one,	  very	  clear,	  microeconomic	  perspective	  on	  this	  issue.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Fiscalis	  group	  of	  EU	  
member	  states	  that	  have	  jointly	  considered	  tax	  gap	  appraisal	  said	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  assessing	  VAT	  
gaps	  that	  “Effective	  collection	  of	  taxes	  is	  a	  cornerstone	  of	  a	  fair	  taxation	  system.	  Taxes	  that	  remain	  
unpaid	  cause	  revenue	  loss	  in	  the	  budget	  of	  Member	  States	  and	  may	  lead	  to	  an	  excessive	  burden	  on	  
the	  honest	  taxpayers	  who	  correctly	  fulfil	  their	  tax	  obligations.	  Furthermore,	  effective	  collection	  of	  
taxes	  is	  essential	  for	  level	  playing	  field	  and	  avoids	  economic	  distortions.”	  (Fiscalis	  2016,	  11).	  Both	  
purposes	  are	  equally	  valid.	  However,	  they	  require	  quite	  different	  information.	  
	  
The	  need	  that	  HM	  Revenue	  &	  Customs	  specifies	  is	  best	  met	  by	  bottom-­‐up	  data	  i.e.	  an	  appraisal	  of	  
the	  effective	  management	  of	  data	  supplied	  in	  tax	  returns	  actually	  collected.	  The	  need	  noted	  by	  the	  
Fiscalis	  group	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  met	  in	  that	  way.	  That	  is	  because	  most	  bottom	  up	  analyses	  are	  
only	  prepared	  for	  particular	  taxes,	  and	  not	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  UK's	  tax	  
authority	  continue	  to	  include	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  what	  they	  describe	  as	  ‘illustrative	  estimates’	  in	  
their	  annual	  tax	  gap	  appraisals	  (HMRC	  2018).	  The	  data	  is,	  therefore	  unlikely	  to	  be	  comprehensive.	  In	  
addition,	  because	  the	  data	  in	  bottom-­‐up	  analysis	  is	  very	  largely	  based	  on	  tax	  returns	  received	  it	  is	  
unlikely	  to	  be	  complete	  with	  regard	  the	  shadow	  economy,	  and	  nor	  is	  it	  therefore	  relevant	  or	  reliable	  
for	  assessing	  macro	  economic	  issues,	  whilst	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  tax	  base	  will	  vary	  considerably	  between	  
different	  countries	  also	  makes	  comparison	  between	  estimates	  prepared	  on	  this	  basis	  unlikely	  to	  be	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useful.	  In	  contrast,	  data	  on	  GDP	  and	  tax	  revenues	  collected	  is	  available	  for	  most	  countries	  (subject	  to	  
the	  points	  made	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  paper)	  meaning	  that	  estimates	  prepared	  based	  on	  such	  sources	  
are	  likely	  to	  be	  useful	  for	  macroeconomic	  decision-­‐making	  purposes	  with	  regard	  to	  tax	  issues.	  	  It	  is	  
suggested	  that	  a	  top	  down	  approach	  to	  tax	  gap	  estimation	  is	  to	  be	  preferred	  if	  the	  data	  is	  to	  be	  used	  
for	  macroeconomic	  management	  of	  the	  economy	  but	  that	  bottom-­‐up	  analyses	  have	  a	  use	  for	  the	  
appraisal	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  tax	  authorities.	  	  
	  
6. GDP	  Data	  issues	  
If	  a	  GDP	  based	  approach	  to	  tax	  gap	  estimation	  is	  required	  to	  provide	  useful	  data	  to	  appraise	  relative	  
tax	  gaps	  and	  what	  might	  be	  done	  about	  them	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  data	  available	  to	  undertake	  this	  
exercise	  must	  be	  assessed.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  remarkable	  unanimity	  with	  regard	  to	  European	  Union	  GDP	  data.	  Using	  2015	  data	  as	  the	  
basis	  for	  research,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  most	  recent	  year	  for	  which	  OECD	  tax	  authority	  data	  is	  available	  
at	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  the	  Eurostat	  GDP	  data	  that	  has	  been	  used	  in	  the	  analyses	  we	  have	  undertaken	  
because	  it	  is	  almost	  identical,	  barring	  what	  must	  be	  tiny	  exchange	  differences,	  with	  that	  published	  
by	  the	  IMF,	  World	  Bank	  and	  United	  Nations	  based	  on	  our	  currency	  conversions.	  At	  this	  level	  there	  
appears	  to	  be	  total	  unanimity	  on	  the	  available	  data,	  albeit	  that	  this	  does	  in	  all	  likelihood	  simply	  
indicate	  willingness	  to	  utilise	  EU	  member	  state	  nationally	  published	  information.	  This	  is,	  perhaps,	  
not	  too	  surprising.	  Each	  officially	  subscribes	  to	  a	  common	  framework	  for	  national	  income	  reporting	  
that	  was	  relatively	  recently	  updated	  (Eurostat	  2013).	  
	  
The	  more	  difficult	  question	  that	  then	  follows	  is	  whether	  this	  accord	  on	  published	  GDP	  data	  actually	  
reflects	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  the	  jurisdiction	  to	  which	  it	  relates?	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  the	  
extent	  to	  which	  the	  published	  estimates	  of	  GDP	  (and	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  all	  GDP	  figures	  are	  
estimates)	  reflect	  activity	  in	  the	  shadow	  economy	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  publish	  them,	  and	  whether	  
those	  estimates	  are	  themselves	  consistently	  prepared.	  There	  is	  surprisingly	  little	  literature	  on	  this	  
issue,	  and	  much	  that	  there	  is	  has	  been	  published	  by	  the	  International	  Organisations	  that	  regularly	  
publish	  comparative	  GDP	  data.	  So,	  for	  example,	  Eurostat	  devote	  a	  small	  mention	  of	  a	  few	  
paragraphs	  to	  the	  issue	  in	  their	  guide	  to	  the	  accounting	  requirements	  of	  EU	  member	  states	  (Eurostat	  
2013,	  310).	  In	  this	  they	  suggest	  that	  the:	  
	  
Value	  of	  production	  activities	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  observed	  are,	  in	  principle,	  included	  within	  
the	  national	  accounts	  production	  boundary.	  The	  following	  three	  types	  of	  activity	  are	  
therefore	  included:	  	  
	  
(a) illegal	  activities	  where	  the	  parties	  are	  willing	  partners	  in	  an	  economic	  transaction;	  	  
(b)	  hidden	  and	  underground	  activities	  where	  the	  transactions	  themselves	  are	  not	  against	  the	  
law,	  but	  are	  unreported	  to	  avoid	  official	  scrutiny;	  	  
(c)	  activities	  described	  as	  ‘informal’,	  typically	  where	  no	  records	  are	  kept.	  	  
	  
In	  principle,	  the	  remuneration	  of	  these	  workers	  is	  included	  in	  compensation	  of	  employees	  or	  
mixed	  income.	  This	  adjustment	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  the	  data	  on	  employment	  and	  





Illegal	  activities	  where	  either	  of	  the	  parties	  are	  not	  willing	  participants	  (e.g.	  theft)	  are	  not	  
economic	  transactions	  and	  so	  are	  not	  included	  in	  the	  production	  boundary	  
	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  words	  in	  their	  commentary	  are	  ‘in	  principle’	  since	  it	  is	  not	  apparent	  
from	  this	  guide	  how	  such	  activities	  are	  in	  practice	  to	  be	  accounted	  for.	  In	  practice	  the	  United	  
Kingdom’s	  Official	  for	  National	  Statistics	  gives	  some	  indication	  of	  is	  approach	  to	  this	  issue	  when	  
saying	  that	  from	  2015	  onwards	  it	  would	  when	  preparing	  UK	  national	  accounts:	  
	  
replace	  the	  existing	  National	  Accounts	  concealed	  income/activity	  model	  with	  a	  new,	  more	  
comprehensive	  model	  based,	  in	  part,	  on	  analysis	  by	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Revenue	  and	  Customs	  
(HMRC)	  of	  evaded	  corporation	  and	  income	  tax	  and	  update	  existing	  estimates	  of	  missing	  
production	  by	  unincorporated	  businesses	  below	  the	  VAT	  and/or	  PAYE	  thresholds	  using	  
updated	  administrative	  data	  provided	  by	  HMRC.	  (ONS	  2015)	  
	  
The	  problems	  with	  this	  approach	  are	  immediately	  apparent.	  Firstly,	  the	  UK	  is	  alone	  in	  the	  EU	  in	  
undertaking	  annual	  tax	  gap	  appraisals,	  and	  most	  member	  states	  have	  done	  none	  at	  all	  (Murphy	  &	  
Petersen	  2018,	  Fiscalis	  2016).	  Secondly,	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  HM	  Revenue	  &	  Customs	  estimate	  
of	  tax	  evaded,	  based	  as	  it	  is	  on	  tax	  returns	  submitted	  to	  them,	  is	  adequate.	  This	  is	  open	  to	  doubt	  
(Murphy	  2014).	  Thirdly,	  tax	  data	  which	  may	  itself	  be	  incorrect	  because	  it	  does	  not	  appropriately	  
record	  the	  activities	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  sized	  entities	  is	  used	  to	  make	  good	  the	  deficiencies	  in	  
recording	  their	  activities	  in	  GDP	  data.	  The	  likelihood	  is	  that	  the	  UK	  GDP	  data	  is	  substantially	  under-­‐
recorded	  as	  a	  result.	  This	  impression	  is	  reinforced	  by	  the	  observation	  by	  HM	  Revenue	  &	  Customs	  in	  
their	  own	  note	  on	  their	  tax	  gap	  methodology,	  where	  it	  is	  admitted	  that	  significant	  parts	  of	  their	  data	  
are	  made	  up	  of	  ‘illustrative	  estimates’	  or	  are	  based	  on	  ‘developing	  methodologies’	  i.e.	  there	  is	  no	  
robust	  estimate	  available	  at	  all	  (HMRC	  2018,	  16).	  
	  
The	  OECD	  has	  noted	  (Blades	  and	  Lequiller,	  2014)	  that	  the	  shadow,	  or	  non-­‐observed	  economy	  (as	  
they	  prefer	  to	  call	  it)	  is	  made	  up	  of	  two	  parts.	  One	  is	  illegal	  activity,	  such	  as	  prostitution	  and	  the	  
trade	  in	  illicit	  drugs.	  These	  authors	  suggest	  that	  this	  amounts	  to	  less	  than	  1%	  of	  GDP	  in	  most	  
countries	  (Blades	  and	  Lequiller	  2014,	  109).	  They	  do	  not	  provide	  a	  source	  for	  this	  opinion.	  They	  then	  
add	  that	  the	  second	  part	  of	  non-­‐observed	  activity	  comprises	  unrecorded	  but	  otherwise	  legal	  activity,	  
which	  they	  suggest	  might	  vary	  from	  between	  2%	  and	  15%	  of	  the	  GDP	  of	  OECD	  countries.	  They	  
explicitly	  suggest	  that	  the	  gap	  for	  Spain	  at	  the	  time	  that	  they	  wrote	  might	  be	  11.2%.	  They	  also	  note	  
(Blades	  and	  Lequiller	  2014,	  123)	  that	  the	  adjustment	  in	  GDP	  for	  the	  non-­‐observed	  economy	  is	  in	  the	  
case	  of	  France	  4%,	  but	  that	  this	  is	  ‘just	  an	  approximation’.	  These	  authors	  also	  admit	  that	  such	  
estimates	  should	  also	  include	  allowance	  for	  the	  faults	  in	  statistical	  methods	  in	  recording	  all	  activity.	  	  
In	  so	  doing	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  they	  base	  their	  work	  on	  that	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  its	  work	  on	  
Systems	  of	  National	  Accounts	  (United	  Nations	  2009).	  	  
	  
This	  UN	  report,	  which	  was	  co-­‐published	  with	  the	  European	  Commission,	  International	  Monetary	  
Fund,	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  and	  World	  Bank,	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  
most	  recent	  attempt	  by	  International	  Organisation	  to	  appraise	  this	  issue.	  It	  has	  a	  slightly	  different	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focus	  from	  the	  OECD,	  separating	  non-­‐observed	  activity	  between	  the	  formal	  sector	  and	  the	  informal	  
sector,	  each	  of	  which	  can	  be	  observed	  and	  unobserved.	  It	  does	  not,	  as	  such,	  address	  illicit	  activity,	  
making	  it	  clear	  that	  a	  focus	  on	  developing	  countries	  (which	  the	  OECD	  does	  not	  have)	  requires	  this	  
difference	  of	  emphasis	  (United	  Nations	  2009,	  471).	  The	  result	  is	  that	  it	  suggests	  that	  the	  non-­‐




Source:	  United	  Nations	  2009,	  471	  
	  
The	  issue	  of	  significance	  here	  is	  that	  the	  informal,	  formal	  and	  non-­‐observed	  sectors	  can	  overlap	  
because	  of	  the	  difficulty	  in	  identifying	  boundaries	  between	  the	  two,	  most	  especially	  when	  many	  
small	  enterprises	  will	  often	  declare	  a	  part	  but	  not	  all	  of	  their	  income	  (Slemrod	  2007)	  and	  that	  the	  
not-­‐observed	  sector	  can	  therefore	  comprise	  parts	  of	  both,	  most	  especially	  when	  survey	  based	  
research	  can	  identify	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  informal	  sector	  for	  inclusion	  in	  GDP	  estimates.	  	  
	  
Eurostat	  also	  reference	  this	  issue	  in	  a	  website	  discussion5.	  Their	  discussion,	  like	  the	  other	  sources	  
noted,	  is	  light	  on	  noted	  data	  sources,	  barring	  the	  UN	  paper	  (2009)	  and	  adds	  almost	  nothing	  to	  
knowledge	  on	  this	  issue.	  This,	  however,	  is	  misleading	  as	  in	  practice	  Eurostat	  do,	  according	  to	  
Andrews	  et	  al	  (2011,	  12)	  record	  the	  informal	  sector	  in	  EU	  member	  states	  under	  seven	  headings	  
within	  their	  accounting	  framework.	  These	  are:	  
	  
1. Producers	  not	  registering	  to	  evade	  tax	  or	  social	  security	  obligations;	  
2. Producers	  not	  registering	  because	  their	  activities	  are	  illegal;	  
3. Producers	  not	  required	  to	  register	  e.g.	  because	  they	  only	  make	  goods	  for	  home	  
consumption	  within	  the	  family	  unit;	  
4. Producers	  not	  surveyed	  for	  national	  accounting	  purposes	  either	  because	  it	  is	  not	  
economically	  worthwhile	  to	  do	  so	  as	  the	  entities	  are	  small	  or	  registers	  of	  entities	  are	  out	  of	  
date;	  
5. Producers	  not	  surveyed	  due	  to	  statistical	  errors;	  




6. Producers	  deliberately	  under-­‐reporting	  despite	  being	  surveyed	  to	  under-­‐declare	  tax	  
liabilities;	  
7. Other	  statistical	  mistakes.	  
	  
This	  approach	  is	  reflected	  in	  their	  definition	  of	  the	  non-­‐observed	  economy	  which	  they	  define	  as	  
follows	  (Eurostat	  2018):	  
	  
Non-­‐observed	  economy	  (NOE)	  refers	  to	  all	  productive	  activities	  that	  may	  not	  be	  captured	  in	  
the	  basic	  data	  sources	  used	  for	  compiling	  national	  accounts.	  The	  following	  activities	  are	  
included:	  underground,	  informal	  (including	  those	  undertaken	  by	  households	  for	  their	  own	  
final	  use),	  illegal,	  and	  other	  activities	  omitted	  due	  to	  deficiencies	  in	  the	  basic	  data	  collection	  
program.	  The	  term	  ‘non-­‐observed	  economy’	  encompasses	  all	  of	  these	  activities	  and	  the	  
related	  statistical	  estimation	  problems.	  
	  
The	  definition	  is	  interesting	  but	  because	  of	  its	  breadth	  little	  practical	  use	  for	  appraising	  illicit	  flows	  
arising	  in	  shadow	  economies:	  activities	  undertaken	  for	  own	  consumption	  clearly	  do	  not	  contribute	  
to	  this.	  In	  addition,	  the	  recognition	  that	  data	  deficiencies	  contribute	  to	  the	  NOE	  adds	  little	  to	  the	  
usefulness	  of	  this	  definition.	  	  
	  
More	  tellingly,	  Andrews	  et	  all	  (2011,	  13)	  note	  that	  ‘Although	  estimates	  of	  the	  non-­‐observed	  
economy	  provide	  a	  useful	  gauge	  of	  informality,	  these	  estimates	  are	  not	  typically	  available	  from	  
national	  statistical	  offices,	  and	  in	  the	  event	  that	  they	  are	  available,	  differences	  in	  methodological	  
approaches	  may	  hinder	  cross-­‐country	  comparisons.	  Moreover,	  the	  estimates	  include	  other	  statistical	  
deficiencies	  not	  related	  to	  informal	  activities’.	  Given	  that	  these	  authors	  were	  writing	  quite	  recently	  
for	  publication	  by	  the	  OECD	  what	  is	  apparent	  is	  that	  just	  how	  reliable	  GDP	  data	  might	  be	  on	  this	  
issue	  is	  exceptionally	  hard	  to	  assess.	  	  Recourse	  has	  then	  to	  be	  made	  to	  other	  sources	  to	  determine	  
what	  that	  proportion	  should	  be.	  
	  
7. Tax	  data	  issues	  
	  
There	  are,	  as	  noted,	  issues	  of	  concern	  with	  regard	  to	  GDP	  data	  when	  seeking	  to	  determine	  whether	  
or	  not	  it	  includes	  reasonable	  estimates	  of	  the	  illicit	  financial	  flows	  within	  EU	  member	  states,	  or	  not.	  	  
Before	  resolving	  the	  conundrums	  this	  creates	  it	  is	  also	  appropriate	  to	  note	  that	  other	  data	  concerns	  
do	  also	  arise	  when	  seeking	  to	  prepare	  macroeconomic	  estimates	  of	  the	  tax	  gap.	  In	  particular,	  there	  
is	  surprising	  difficulty	  in	  securing	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  reliable	  data	  on	  tax	  yield	  for	  each	  EU	  member	  
state,	  whether	  in	  total	  or	  by	  tax.	  There	  are	  also	  significant	  apparent	  differences	  in	  recorded	  data	  on	  
the	  number	  of	  taxpayers	  making	  contribution	  to	  such	  yields.	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  importance.	  If	  the	  
scale	  of	  the	  tax	  lost	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  best	  estimated	  by	  multiplying	  the	  value	  of	  flows	  in	  the	  
NOE,	  or	  shadow	  economy,	  by	  the	  aggregate	  tax	  rate,	  which	  itself	  is	  determined	  as	  the	  percentage	  of	  
GDP	  that	  aggregate	  tax	  revenues	  for	  each	  jurisdiction	  represent,	  then	  ensuring	  that	  the	  aggregate	  
tax	  take	  is	  properly	  stated	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  some	  significance	  in	  this	  calculation.	  We	  assumed	  when	  
starting	  this	  work	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  problems	  arising	  on	  this	  issue.	  In	  practice	  this	  assumption	  
has	  proved	  to	  be	  misplaced.	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The	  work	  in	  which	  this	  paper	  is	  based	  was,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  appraise	  the	  
efficiency	  of	  the	  EU's	  tax	  authorities.	  	  The	  best	  available	  data	  on	  tax	  authority	  activity	  has	  been	  
published	  by	  the	  OECD	  (2017).	  Included	  in	  that	  publication	  is	  data	  on	  tax	  yield	  by	  member	  state.	  
When	  using	  this	  data	  we	  noted	  apparent	  discrepancies	  with	  some	  national	  data.	  This	  led	  us	  to	  
investigate	  alternative	  sources	  of	  information.	  Two	  were	  identified.	  One	  was	  the	  annual	  publication	  
of	  the	  European	  Commission’s	  Taxation	  and	  Customs	  Union	  surveying	  the	  tax	  administrations	  of	  the	  
EU,	  which	  includes	  statistical	  data	  on	  revenues	  collected	  by	  each	  EU	  member	  state	  (European	  
Commission,	  2017).	  This	  data	  is	  expressed	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  GDP.	  We	  translated	  it	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  
comparison	  into	  monetary	  totals,	  aided	  by	  the	  consistent	  reporting	  of	  GDP	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  
previously	  noted.	  The	  other	  available	  database	  its	  that	  published	  by	  the	  International	  Centre	  for	  Tax	  
and	  Development	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Sussex	  and	  now	  maintained	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  University	  
(UNU-­‐WIDER,	  2017).	  This	  includes	  all	  EU	  member	  states.	  As	  with	  the	  EU	  data,	  this	  dataset	  expresses	  
revenues	  collected	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  and	  this	  data	  has,	  again,	  been	  translated	  into	  monetary	  
values	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  comparison	  with	  OECD	  data.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  data	  within	  this	  UNU-­‐
Wider	  database	  has	  been	  collected	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  sources.	  The	  most	  common	  source	  for	  EU	  
member	  states	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  OECD.	  The	  principle	  alternative	  is	  the	  IMF’s	  Government	  Finance	  
Statistics	  database.	  Data	  for	  Croatia	  fro	  2015	  was	  not	  available	  from	  UNU-­‐Wider	  and	  that	  for	  2014	  
for	  this	  country	  alone	  has	  been	  used	  instead.	  As	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  these	  data	  sources	  were	  all	  
providing	  different	  indications	  of	  total	  taxation	  revenues	  by	  state	  and	  type	  of	  tax	  an	  additional	  
bench	  mark	  test	  was	  also	  made:	  the	  reported	  tax	  revenue	  for	  the	  UK	  for	  its	  tax	  year	  2015	  -­‐	  16	  
(admittedly	  ending	  31	  March	  2016,	  but	  the	  only	  reliably	  published	  data	  for	  this	  country)	  has	  been	  
compared	  with	  each	  other	  source	  to	  test	  their	  reliability	  (Office	  for	  Budget	  Responsibility	  2017).	  
	  
The	  result	  of	  comparing	  these	  various	  data	  sources	  was	  surprising.	  All	  data	  is	  expressed	  in	  millions	  of	  
euros,	  with	  the	  exchange	  from	  UK	  pounds	  (when	  required)	  being	  made	  at	  European	  Union	  official	  
exchange	  rates:	  
	  
Table	  1	  Total	  tax	  revenues	  by	  EU	  member	  state	  as	  reported	  by	  differing	  data	  sources	  (Euro’m)	  
	  
	  
OECD	  total	  revenue	   EU	  Total	  revenue	   UNU	  total	  revenue	  
Austria	  	   	  101,655	  	   	  148,821	  	   	  96,620	  	  
	  Belgium	  	   	  141,406	  	   	  185,451	  	   	  115,012	  	  
	  Bulgaria	  	   	  11,142	  	   	  13,178	  	   	  9,517	  	  
	  Croatia	  	   	  12,769	  	   	  16,518	  	   	  10,162	  	  
	  Cyprus	  	   	  3,104	  	   	  5,890	  	   	  4,347	  	  
	  Czech	  Republic	  	   	  37,683	  	   	  57,281	  	   	  31,970	  	  
	  Denmark	  	   	  158,363	  	   	  126,377	  	   	  115,249	  	  
	  Estonia	  	   	  8,196	  	   	  6,857	  	   	  4,556	  	  
	  Finland	  	   	  70,471	  	   	  92,016	  	   	  65,087	  	  
	  France	  	   	  577,977	  	   	  1,000,575	  	   	  585,175	  	  
	  Germany	  	   	  540,666	  	   	  1,168,762	  	   	  689,791	  	  
	  Greece	  	   	  47,875	  	   	  64,530	  	   	  45,124	  	  
	  Hungary	  	   	  46,951	  	   	  42,960	  	   	  28,828	  	  
	  Ireland	  	   	  61,616	  	   	  61,317	  	   	  50,211	  	  
	  Italy	  	   	  429,765	  	   	  710,628	  	   	  492,733	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  Latvia	  	   	  8,564	  	   	  7,320	  	   	  5,019	  	  
	  Lithuania	  	   	  7,656	  	   	  10,816	  	   	  6,452	  	  
	  Luxembourg	  	   	  11,874	  	   	  19,382	  	   	  13,242	  	  
	  Malta	  	   	  2,381	  	   	  3,055	  	   	  2,504	  	  
	  Netherlands	  	   	  263,149	  	   	  255,613	  	   	  163,339	  	  
	  Poland	  	   	  80,372	  	   	  139,338	  	   	  85,132	  	  
	  Portugal	  	   	  50,357	  	   	  61,854	  	   	  41,206	  	  
	  Romania	  	   	  45,956	  	   	  44,888	  	   	  31,936	  	  
	  Slovakia	  	   	  19,658	  	   	  25,326	  	   	  14,261	  	  
	  Slovenia	  	   	  13,293	  	   	  14,214	  	   	  8,463	  	  
	  Spain	  	   	  225,764	  	   	  363,959	  	   	  235,776	  	  
	  Sweden	  	   	  186,230	  	   	  193,525	  	   	  146,358	  	  
	  United	  Kingdom	  	   	  659,654	  	   	  861,308	  	   	  645,771	  	  
	  	   	  3,824,547	  	   	  5,701,760	  	   	  3,743,843	  	  
	  
Sources:	  as	  noted	  
	  






Sources:	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  
	  





Variously	  recorded	  tax	  revenue	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  in	  2015	  	  
	  
	  
OECD	   EU	   UNU	   UK	  
	  
€'m	   €'m	   €'m	   €'m	  
Total	  revenues	   	  659,654	  	   	  861,308	  	   	  645,771	  	   	  867,960	  	  
Personal	  income	  
tax	   	  224,705	  	   	  236,795	  	   	  235,418	  	   	  232,696	  	  
Corporate	  income	  
tax	   	  57,037	  	   	  65,053	  	   	  63,745	  	   	  62,824	  	  
VAT	   	  120,830	  	   	  176,945	  	   	  198,272	  	   	  179,792	  	  
Social	  security	   	  148,793	  	   	  161,333	  	   	  199,676	  	   	  157,197	  	  
Total	  excl.	  overall	  
revenues	   	  551,365	  	   	  640,126	  	   	  697,110	  	   	  632,509	  	  
	  
Sources:	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  and	  authors’	  calculations	  
	  
Expressed	  as	  percentage	  variances	  from	  the	  UK’s	  officially	  reported	  revenue	  for	  the	  tax	  year	  in	  
question	  these	  are	  as	  follows:	  
	  




OECD	   EU	   UNU	   UK	  
Total	  revenues	   76.0%	   99.2%	   74.4%	   100.0%	  
Personal	  income	  
tax	   96.6%	   101.8%	   101.2%	   100.0%	  
Corporate	  income	  
tax	   90.8%	   103.5%	   101.5%	   100.0%	  
VAT	   67.2%	   98.4%	   110.3%	   100.0%	  
Social	  security	   94.7%	   102.6%	   127.0%	   100.0%	  
Total	  excl.	  overall	  
revenues	   87.2%	   101.2%	   110.2%	   100.0%	  
	  
Sources	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  and	  authors’	  calculations	  
	  
Given	  that	  the	  EU	  tax	  revenue	  data	  most	  closely	  accords	  with	  that	  for	  the	  UK,	  which	  is	  verifiably	  
accurate,	  it	  is	  this	  source	  that	  is	  to	  be	  relied	  upon	  in	  this	  research.	  This	  does	  not,	  however,	  prevent	  
an	  important	  conclusion	  being	  drawn,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  tangential	  to	  the	  overall	  issue	  that	  this	  paper	  is	  
addressing,	  which	  is	  that	  to	  compare	  the	  efficiency	  of	  tax	  authorities	  reliable	  data	  is	  required	  and	  it	  
would	  appear	  that	  neither	  the	  OECD	  or	  UNU	  data	  sets	  meet	  this	  criteria.	  Any	  conclusions	  based	  
upon	  them	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  inaccurate	  as	  a	  result,	  and	  researchers	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  this.	  The	  
 23 
Eurostat	  data	  is	  also	  not	  beyond	  question	  for	  this	  reason.	  Better	  explanation	  of	  the	  sources	  for	  
reported	  data	  appear	  to	  be	  required	  in	  all	  cases	  if	  decision-­‐making	  is	  to	  be	  reliable.	  	  
	  
8. Issues	  with	  data	  on	  the	  shadow	  economy	  
	  
The	  number	  of	  countries	  within	  the	  EU,	  or	  anywhere	  else,	  estimating	  tax	  gaps	  is	  very	  limited	  indeed	  
(Murphy	  &	  Petersen	  2018,	  Fiscalis	  2016).	  The	  majority	  of	  those	  that	  do	  so	  only	  publish	  data	  with	  
regard	  to	  VAT	  (Fiscalis	  2016).	  Only	  the	  UK	  undertakes	  an	  annual	  estimate	  across	  a	  range	  of	  taxes	  but	  
all	  of	  the	  data	  reported	  is	  prepared	  on	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  basis	  excluding	  VAT	  (HMRC	  2018)	  and	  is	  
therefore	  unlikely	  to	  be	  comparable	  with	  data	  from	  other	  EU	  member	  states.	  	  The	  only	  officially	  
prepared	  estimates	  that	  might	  achieve	  this	  goal	  of	  comparability	  are	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  VAT	  tax	  
gap	  now	  prepared	  for	  all	  EU	  member	  states	  annually	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  European	  Commission	  (EC	  DGT	  
2018).	  This	  estimate	  is	  based	  on	  observed	  national	  accounts	  data	  included	  in	  GDP	  (EC	  DGT	  2018,	  15).	  
The	  methodology,	  in	  effect,	  estimates	  the	  amount	  of	  VAT	  that	  should	  be	  charged	  at	  prevailing	  rates	  
applicable	  within	  a	  state	  on	  identified	  consumption	  within	  GDP	  and	  then	  compares	  the	  total	  
resulting	  theoretical	  tax	  yield	  with	  the	  actual	  tax	  collected.	  The	  result	  is	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  ‘tax	  
compliance	  gap’	  i.e.	  the	  sum	  lost	  because	  of	  taxpayer	  non	  compliance	  whether	  due	  to	  criminality,	  
tax	  evasion,	  tax	  avoidance	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  tax	  simply	  not	  collected	  because	  the	  taxpayer	  had	  
become	  insolvent	  before	  the	  sum	  due	  could	  be	  collected.	  	  
	  
For	  the	  purposes	  of	  appraising	  the	  size	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  the	  estimate	  is	  of	  significance.	  VAT	  is	  
a	  tax	  on	  final	  consumption,	  whether	  by	  consumers	  or	  other	  non-­‐VAT	  registered	  entities.	  It	  is	  
therefore	  a	  tax	  that	  is,	  at	  least	  in	  principle,	  charged	  on	  one	  of	  the	  key	  components	  of	  GDP.	  As	  is	  
noted	  by	  those	  preparing	  the	  estimates,	  the	  VAT	  tax	  base	  is	  by	  no	  means	  comprehensive	  with	  just	  
55.2%	  of	  theoretically	  chargeable	  VAT	  tax	  base	  actually	  being	  subject	  to	  tax	  at	  the	  full	  VAT	  rate	  in	  
2016	  (EC	  DGT	  2018,	  51).	  This	  is	  because	  some	  elements	  of	  consumption	  are	  exempt	  from	  VAT	  
charge	  in	  the	  EU	  e.g.	  healthcare	  and	  education	  are	  almost	  invariably	  treated	  as	  such.	  Other	  parts	  of	  
consumption	  are	  also	  taxed	  at	  lower	  or	  even	  zero	  rate:	  clearly	  there	  can	  be	  no	  effective	  measure	  of	  
the	  tax	  gap	  attributable	  to	  VAT	  in	  the	  latter	  case.	  The	  authors	  describe	  the	  resulting	  uncollected	  tax	  
as	  the	  ‘	  VAT	  policy	  gap’,	  which	  is	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  potential	  tax	  revenue	  that	  could	  have	  
been	  raised	  if	  all	  end	  consumption	  had	  been	  charged	  to	  VAT	  at	  the	  prevailing	  standard	  rate	  of	  tax	  
applying	  in	  the	  jurisdiction	  for	  which	  the	  calculation	  is	  being	  undertaken	  that	  is	  not	  payable	  because	  
of	  the	  decision	  of	  its	  government	  to	  grant	  allowances,	  reliefs,	  exemptions	  and	  reduced	  rates	  of	  tax.	  
	  




EU	  VAT	  compliance	  gaps	  for	  2015	  and	  2016	  and	  VAT	  policy	  gap	  for	  2016	  
	  
	  	   2015	   2016	  













BE	   	  3,329	  	   10.77	   	  3,079	  	   9.68	   52.47	  
BG	   	  1,058	  	   20.67	   	  693	  	   13.56	   29.00	  
CZ	   	  2,521	  	   16.92	   	  2,165	  	   14.19	   38.49	  
DK	   	  3,054	  	   10.70	   	  2,466	  	   8.51	   42.92	  
DE	   	  24,706	  	   10.45	   	  22,679	  	   9.39	   44.38	  
EE	   	  127	  	   6.33	   	  144	  	   6.78	   34.98	  
IE	   	  1,419	  	   10.61	   	  1,610	  	   11.15	   49.39	  
EL	   	  5,358	  	   29.37	   	  5,916	  	   29.22	   47.55	  
ES	   	  2,897	  	   4.05	   	  1,966	  	   2.71	   59.52	  
FR	   	  19,867	  	   11.58	   	  20,896	  	   11.92	   52.43	  
HR	   	  251	  	   4.22	   	  70	  	   1.15	   36.20	  
IT	   	  35,753	  	   26.13	   	  35,988	  	   25.90	   53.78	  
CY	   	  174	  	   10.28	   	  83	  	   4.73	   43.72	  
LV	   	  389	  	   17.17	   	  258	  	   11.27	   41.70	  
LT	   	  992	  	   25.57	   	  983	  	   24.52	   34.54	  
LU	   	  80	  	   2.28	   	  29	  	   0.85	   40.50	  
HU	   	  1,943	  	   15.40	   	  1,629	  	   13.33	   45.26	  
MT	   	  24	  	   3.42	   	  20	  	   2.71	   42.86	  
NL	   	  4,705	  	   9.49	   	  2,024	  	   4.00	   41.53	  
AT	   	  2,282	  	   8.00	   	  2,149	  	   7.30	   46.15	  
PL	   	  9,652	  	   24.30	   	  8,004	  	   20.80	   48.69	  
PT	   	  2,272	  	   12.88	   	  1,784	  	   10.16	   51.54	  
RO	   	  6,808	  	   34.48	   	  6,137	  	   35.88	   33.94	  
SI	   	  289	  	   8.24	   	  290	  	   8.04	   45.91	  
SK	   	  2,243	  	   29.27	   	  1,872	  	   25.68	   38.84	  
FI	   	  1,405	  	   6.89	   	  1,707	  	   7.98	   49.60	  
SE	   	  1,474	  	   3.51	   	  465	  	   1.08	   46.32	  
UK	   	  22,600	  	   11.04	   	  22,040	  	   11.67	   53.06	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Total	  
EU-­‐28	  
	  157,672	  	   13.2	   	  147,146	  	   12.3	   44.47	  
Median	   	  	   10.7	   	  	   9.9	   	  	  
	  
Source:	  	  EC	  DGT	  2018	  
	  




Trends	  in	  the	  EU	  VAT	  compliance	  gap,	  2009	  -­‐	  2016	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2009	   	  172,954	  	   18.17	   14.30	  
2010	   	  140,624	  	   12.14	   12.00	  
2011	   	  157,117	  	   14.82	   13.15	  
2012	   	  164,879	  	   15.20	   12.30	  
2013	   	  161,442	  	   14.75	   13.81	  
2014	   	  160,221	  	   14.09	   10.92	  
2015	   	  157,672	  	   13.20	   10.70	  
2016	   	  147,146	  	   12.30	   9.90	  
	  
Source:	  	  EC	  DGT	  2018	  and	  earlier	  years	  summarised	  by	  authors	  
	  







Source	  EC	  DGT	  2018	  and	  author’s	  summaries	  of	  prior	  year	  reports	  
	  
In	  percentage	  terms	  the	  trend	  is	  also	  downwards:	  
	  






Source	  EC	  DGT	  2018	  and	  author’s	  summaries	  of	  prior	  year	  reports	  
	  
The	  trend	  is	  data	  is	  favourable.	  The	  volatility	  in	  the	  estimates,	  both	  in	  aggregate	  (where	  the	  results	  
for	  2010	  and	  2011	  appear	  surprising	  and	  counterintuitive,	  since	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  tax	  abuse	  will	  grow	  at	  
a	  time	  of	  economic	  stress)	  and	  that	  individual	  country	  levels	  (where	  some	  results	  appear	  to	  change	  
significantly	  from	  year-­‐to-­‐year)	  suggest	  that	  other	  sources	  of	  data	  that	  might	  indicate	  the	  value	  of	  
the	  illicit	  flows	  on	  which	  tax	  losses	  might	  arise	  would	  be	  of	  benefit	  in	  assisting	  appraisal	  of	  the	  total	  
EU	  Tax	  gap.	  	  
	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  bases	  for	  estimating	  tax	  gaps	  (Andrews	  et	  al,	  2011).	  Perhaps	  the	  longest	  
established	  is	  the	  currency	  demand	  approach	  developed	  by	  Gutmann	  (1977)	  and	  successively	  and	  
developed	  by	  Tanzi	  (1980).	  As	  presented	  by	  Tanzi,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  level	  of	  cash	  
required	  for	  the	  volume	  of	  transactions	  in	  the	  recorded	  economy	  and	  if	  there	  is	  excess	  cash	  in	  use	  
then	  that	  must	  be	  because	  there	  are	  unrecorded	  transactions	  that	  must	  in	  turn	  be	  motivated	  by	  the	  
desire	  to	  evade	  taxes.	  It	  was	  suggested	  by	  Tanzi	  that	  empirical	  data	  supported	  this	  claim.	  There	  are,	  
however,	  limitations	  in	  the	  methodology.	  Ferwerda	  et	  al	  (forthcoming)	  have	  suggested	  that	  Tanzi’s	  
belief	  that	  high	  tax	  rates	  motivate	  tax	  evasion	  can	  only	  be	  evidenced	  in	  periods	  of	  economic	  
volatility	  when	  rates	  change	  significantly.	  It	  is	  their	  suggestion	  that	  this	  was	  only	  true	  in	  the	  1930s,	  
but	  not	  thereafter.	  A	  possible	  interpretation	  is	  that	  this	  implies	  it	  is	  not	  absolute	  tax	  takes	  that	  
motivate	  such	  behaviour	  but	  that	  significant	  changes	  in	  marginal	  rates	  do.	  This	  is	  certainly	  consistent	  
with	  much	  of	  the	  debate	  to	  be	  found	  in	  tax	  practitioner	  journals	  which	  would	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  rate	  
differentials	  (for	  example,	  between	  income	  and	  corporation	  taxes;	  income	  and	  capital	  gains	  taxes	  
and	  between	  social	  security	  tax	  rates	  on	  earned	  and	  unearned	  income)	  that	  motivate	  tax	  avoidance	  
activity,	  meaning	  that	  this	  might	  also	  spillover	  into	  evasion.	  Whatever	  the	  cause,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  as	  
a	  result	  that	  this	  approach	  provides	  sufficient	  evidence	  to	  support	  tax	  gap	  estimates.	  
	  
Recourse	  has	  to	  be	  made	  in	  that	  case	  to	  other	  bases	  of	  estimation,	  of	  which	  the	  most	  commonly	  
used	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  MIMIC	  method,	  where	  MIMIC	  stands	  for	  ‘multiple	  indicator;	  multiple	  causes’.	  
This	  approach,	  most	  commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  work	  of	  Friedrich	  Schneider	  (for	  example,	  in	  
Medina	  and	  Schneider	  2018)	  is	  discussed	  in	  some	  detail	  by	  Schneider	  et	  al	  (2010),	  Raczkowski	  (2015)	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and	  Schneider	  et	  al	  (2015).	  In	  effect,	  the	  method	  uses	  a	  matrix	  of	  indicators	  that	  might	  motivate	  
those	  with	  an	  inclination	  to	  tax	  evade,	  which	  are	  weighted	  as	  to	  perceived	  significance	  and	  then	  
used	  to	  explain	  their	  potential	  impact	  on	  GDP.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  in	  this	  regard	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
suggested	  that	  tax	  evasion	  is	  the	  sole	  contributory	  motive	  for	  this	  unrecorded	  economic	  activity	  
(Schneider	  et	  al	  2010).	  The	  motives	  might	  be	  to	  evade	  any	  type	  of	  regulation,	  but	  it	  so	  happens	  that	  
tax	  will	  be	  evaded	  as	  a	  result.	  Importantly,	  this	  is	  also	  true	  of	  activity	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  evade	  
one	  tax	  e.g.	  VAT,	  which	  then	  necessarily	  means	  that	  other	  taxes	  will	  also	  be	  evaded	  as	  well.	  So,	  for	  
example,	  if	  VAT	  is	  evaded	  then	  other	  taxes	  such	  as	  personal	  and	  corporate	  income	  taxes	  as	  well	  as	  
social	  security	  charges	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  recorded	  as	  being	  due	  because	  the	  turnover	  that	  might	  have	  
been	  recorded	  to	  permit	  their	  payment	  cannot	  be	  reinjected	  into	  the	  income	  statement	  of	  the	  entity	  
that	  has	  suppressed	  one	  part	  of	  its	  activity.	  The	  consequence	  is	  that	  whatever	  the	  motive,	  	  once	  
income	  has	  moved	  into	  the	  shadow	  economy	  all	  taxes	  due	  on	  it	  are	  lost.	  This	  has	  important	  
consequences.	  The	  loss	  of	  one	  tax	  (most	  commonly,	  but	  not	  always,	  VAT)	  has	  spillover	  effects	  into	  all	  
other	  taxes	  and	  as	  such	  aggregate	  tax	  rates	  across	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole	  can	  be	  used	  for	  assessing	  
the	  scale	  of	  losses.	  	  
	  
The	  most	  recent	  version	  of	  a	  MIMIC	  estimate	  that	  has	  passed	  substantial	  peer	  review	  and	  which	  
relates	  to	  2015,	  which	  is	  the	  year	  for	  which	  OECD	  tax	  authority	  data	  is	  available,	  is	  that	  by	  Medina	  
and	  Schneider	  (2015)	  which	  was	  published	  by	  the	  IMF.	  The	  estimates	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  noted	  below.	  
An	  alternative	  recent	  MIMIC	  estimate	  is	  provided	  by	  Raczkowski	  (2015).	  These	  estimates	  relate	  to	  
the	  year	  2014.	  These	  two	  MIMIC	  estimates	  and	  the	  previously	  noted	  VAT	  compliance	  gaps	  (EC	  DGT	  
2018)	  are	  compared	  as	  follows:	  	  
	  

















	  	   %	   %	   %	   %	  
Austria	   9.01	   8.24	   7.50	   8.25	  
Belgium	   17.80	   10.76	   16.40	   14.99	  
Bulgaria	   20.83	   20.58	   31.20	   24.20	  
Croatia	   22.96	   3.92	   28.40	   18.43	  
Cyprus	   32.20	   7.44	   25.20	   21.61	  
Czech	  
Republic	   10.47	   16.48	   15.50	   14.15	  
Denmark	   14.70	   10.83	   13.00	   12.84	  
Estonia	   18.49	   4.88	   27.60	   16.99	  
Finland	   13.30	   6.45	   13.00	   10.92	  
France	   11.65	   11.71	   9.90	   11.09	  
Germany	   7.75	   9.56	   13.00	   10.10	  
Greece	   26.45	   28.27	   23.60	   26.11	  
Hungary	   20.49	   13.74	   22.10	   18.78	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Ireland	   9.58	   9.94	   12.20	   10.57	  
Italy	   22.97	   25.78	   21.10	   23.28	  
Latvia	   16.62	   17.97	   25.50	   20.03	  
Lithuania	   18.65	   26.42	   28.00	   24.36	  
Luxembourg	   10.38	   5.56	   8.00	   7.98	  
Malta	   29.43	   22.54	   24.30	   25.42	  
Netherlands	   7.83	   7.94	   9.10	   8.29	  
Poland	   16.67	   24.51	   23.80	   21.66	  
Portugal	   17.82	   11.46	   19.00	   16.09	  
Romania	   22.94	   37.18	   28.40	   29.51	  
Slovak	  
Republic	   11.18	   29.39	   15.00	   18.52	  
Slovenia	   20.21	   5.52	   23.10	   16.28	  
Spain	   22.01	   3.52	   18.60	   14.71	  
Sweden	   11.74	   -­‐1.42	   13.90	   8.07	  
United	  
Kingdom	   8.32	   10.88	   9.70	   9.63	  
	  	   16.87	   13.93	   18.79	   16.53	  
	  
Sources:	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  and	  authors’	  calculations	  
	  
It	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  that	  these	  sources	  supply	  do	  vary	  quite	  
considerably	  in	  some	  cases.	  If,	  however,	  the	  estimates	  are	  applied	  to	  national	  GDP	  data	  and	  then	  
aggregated	  for	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole	  a	  surprising	  degree	  of	  aggregated	  consistency	  is	  noted,	  whether	  or	  
not	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  shadow	  economy	  is	  included	  in	  full	  in	  the	  reported	  estimate	  of	  GDP	  (Table	  
9)	  or	  GDP	  has	  to	  be	  grossed	  up	  to	  include	  that	  sum	  (Table	  10):	  
	  
















€'bn	   €'bn	   €'bn	   €'bn	  
31.0	   25.8	   28.4	   28.4	  
73.0	   67.3	   44.1	   61.5	  
9.4	   14.1	   9.3	   11.0	  
10.2	   12.6	   1.7	   8.2	  
5.7	   4.5	   1.3	   3.8	  
17.6	   26.1	   27.8	   23.8	  
40.0	   35.3	   29.4	   34.9	  
3.8	   5.6	   1.0	   3.5	  
27.9	   27.2	   13.5	   22.9	  
255.6	   217.2	   256.9	   243.3	  
235.9	   395.7	   291.0	   307.5	  
 29 
46.6	   41.6	   49.8	   46.0	  
22.7	   24.5	   15.2	   20.8	  
25.1	   32.0	   26.0	   27.7	  
379.6	   348.7	   426.0	   384.8	  
4.0	   6.2	   4.4	   4.9	  
7.0	   10.5	   9.9	   9.1	  
5.4	   4.2	   2.9	   4.2	  
2.8	   2.3	   2.1	   2.4	  
53.5	   62.2	   54.3	   56.7	  
71.7	   102.4	   105.4	   93.1	  
32.0	   34.2	   20.6	   28.9	  
36.8	   45.5	   59.6	   47.3	  
8.8	   11.8	   23.2	   14.6	  
7.8	   9.0	   2.1	   6.3	  
237.7	   200.9	   38.0	   158.9	  
52.7	   62.4	   -­‐6.4	   36.3	  
216.5	   252.4	   283.1	   250.7	  
1921.1	   2082.2	   1821.0	   1941.4	  
Sources:	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  and	  authors’	  calculations	  
	  
Table	  10	  –	  Possible	  size	  of	  EU	  shadow	  economies	  if	  the	  shadow	  economy	  is	  not	  included	  in	  
















	  	   €'bn	   €'bn	   €'bn	   €'bn	  
Austria	   34.1	   27.9	   30.9	   31.0	  
Belgium	   88.8	   80.5	   49.5	   72.9	  
Bulgaria	   11.9	   20.5	   11.7	   14.7	  
Croatia	   13.3	   17.7	   1.8	   10.9	  
Cyprus	   8.4	   6.0	   1.4	   5.3	  
Czech	  
Republic	   19.7	   30.9	   33.2	   27.9	  
Denmark	   46.8	   40.6	   33.0	   40.2	  
Estonia	   4.6	   7.8	   1.0	   4.5	  
Finland	   32.2	   31.3	   14.5	   26.0	  
France	   289.3	   241.1	   291.0	   273.8	  
Germany	   255.7	   454.8	   321.7	   344.1	  
Greece	   63.4	   54.5	   69.5	   62.5	  
Hungary	   28.5	   31.4	   17.6	   25.9	  
Ireland	   27.8	   36.4	   28.9	   31.0	  
Italy	   492.8	   442.0	   574.0	   502.9	  
Latvia	   4.8	   8.3	   5.3	   6.2	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Lithuania	   8.6	   14.6	   13.4	   12.2	  
Luxembourg	   6.0	   4.5	   3.1	   4.5	  
Malta	   4.0	   3.1	   2.8	   3.3	  
Netherlands	   58.1	   68.4	   58.9	   61.8	  
Poland	   86.0	   134.3	   139.6	   120.0	  
Portugal	   39.0	   42.2	   23.3	   34.8	  
Romania	   47.7	   63.6	   94.9	   68.7	  
Slovak	  
Republic	   9.9	   13.9	   32.8	   18.9	  
Slovenia	   9.8	   11.7	   2.3	   7.9	  
Spain	   304.8	   246.8	   39.4	   197.0	  
Sweden	   59.7	   72.5	   -­‐6.3	   42.0	  
United	  
Kingdom	   236.1	   279.5	   317.7	   277.8	  
	  	   2292.1	   2486.7	   2207.2	   2328.7	  
	  
Sources:	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  and	  authors’	  calculations	  
	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  consistency	  an	  aggregate	  estimate	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  for	  each	  EU	  member	  state	  can	  
be	  prepared,	  assuming	  that	  the	  average	  shadow	  economy	  noted	  in	  Tables	  9	  and	  10	  exists,	  with	  the	  
estimate	  being	  made	  at	  the	  aggregate	  tax	  rate	  reported	  by	  Eurostat:	  
	  
























	  	   €'bn	   %	   €'bn	   €'bn	  
Austria	   344.5	   43.2%	   13.4	   12.3	  
Belgium	   410.3	   45.2%	   33.0	   27.8	  
Bulgaria	   45.3	   29.1%	   4.3	   3.2	  
Croatia	   44.5	   37.1%	   4.0	   3.0	  
Cyprus	   17.7	   33.2%	   1.8	   1.3	  
Czech	  
Republic	   168.5	   34.0%	   9.5	   8.1	  
Denmark	   271.8	   46.5%	   18.7	   16.2	  
Estonia	   20.3	   33.7%	   1.5	   1.2	  
Finland	   209.6	   43.9%	   11.4	   10.0	  
France	   2194.2	   45.6%	   124.9	   110.9	  
Germany	   3043.7	   38.4%	   132.1	   118.1	  
Greece	   176.3	   36.6%	   22.9	   16.8	  
Hungary	   110.7	   38.8%	   10.0	   8.1	  
Ireland	   262.0	   23.4%	   7.3	   6.5	  
Italy	   1652.6	   43.0%	   216.3	   165.5	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Latvia	   24.3	   30.1%	   1.9	   1.5	  
Lithuania	   37.4	   28.9%	   3.5	   2.6	  
Luxembourg	   52.1	   37.2%	   1.7	   1.5	  
Malta	   9.5	   32.1%	   1.0	   0.8	  
Netherlands	   683.5	   37.4%	   23.1	   21.2	  
Poland	   430.1	   32.4%	   38.9	   30.2	  
Portugal	   179.8	   34.4%	   12.0	   10.0	  
Romania	   160.3	   28.0%	   19.2	   13.2	  
Slovak	  
Republic	   78.9	   32.1%	   6.1	   4.7	  
Slovenia	   38.8	   36.6%	   2.9	   2.3	  
Spain	   1080.0	   33.7%	   66.4	   53.5	  
Sweden	   449.0	   43.1%	   18.1	   15.6	  
United	  
Kingdom	   2602.1	   33.1%	   91.9	   83.0	  
	  	   14798.0	   36.1%	   897.6	   749.1	  
	  
Sources:	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  and	  authors’	  calculations	  
	  
The	  resulting	  tax	  gap	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  a	  range	  between	  the	  figures	  noted.	  Doubt	  arises	  because,	  as	  
previously	  noted,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  estimated	  part	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  is	  included	  with	  
GDP	  is	  not	  known.	  
	  
8. Further	  issues	  to	  note	  with	  the	  tax	  gap	  estimates	  
	  
A	  number	  of	  additional	  issues	  need	  to	  be	  noted	  with	  regard	  to	  these	  tax	  gap	  estimates.	  The	  first	  is	  
that	  they	  only	  relate	  to	  issues	  recorded	  within	  GDP.	  As	  noted	  in	  figures	  1	  and	  2,	  this	  leaves	  a	  
significant	  range	  of	  transactions	  to	  which	  the	  estimated	  rate	  of	  loss	  has	  not	  been	  applied.	  So,	  and	  for	  
example,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  corporate	  tax	  base	  shifted	  wholly	  out	  of	  an	  economy,	  whether	  artificially	  
or	  not,	  is	  excluded	  from	  this	  estimate.	  So	  too	  are	  estimated	  tax	  losses	  arising	  because	  of	  capital	  
gains,	  the	  abuse	  of	  wealth	  and	  gift	  taxes,	  and	  other	  such	  taxes.	  However,	  an	  estimate	  is	  by	  default	  
included	  on	  those	  deemed	  transactions	  included	  in	  GDP	  but	  which	  do	  not	  get	  reflected	  in	  taxable	  
transactions	  in	  the	  real	  economy.	  These	  factors	  clearly	  add	  some	  uncertainty	  to	  the	  estimates.	  
	  
Tax	  avoidance	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  estimate	  as	  such,	  except	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  reduces	  overall	  tax	  
yield	  within	  the	  economy.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  bad	  debt,	  which	  cannot	  be	  separately	  identified	  using	  
these	  methods.	  In	  other	  words,	  tiers	  3,	  4	  and	  5	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  as	  noted	  above	  are	  combined	  in	  these	  
estimates.	  	  The	  method	  does	  not	  also	  reflect	  any	  loss	  to	  tax	  policy	  (tiers	  one	  and	  two	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  
as	  noted	  by	  Murphy	  and	  Petersen.	  2018).	  In	  effect,	  the	  estimate	  offered	  is	  of	  the	  tax	  compliance	  gap	  
alone.	  	  
	  
That	  said	  an	  estimate	  for	  the	  tax	  policy	  gap	  can	  be	  suggested.	  If	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  of	  the	  28	  EU	  member	  
states	  just	  seven	  have	  aggregate	  tax	  rates	  exceeding	  40%,	  but	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  this	  implied	  that	  
tax	  policy	  would	  permit	  such	  rates	  to	  be	  charged	  in	  other	  EU	  member	  states	  and	  that	  it	  is	  
government	  decision	  that	  means	  that	  they	  are	  not	  then	  an	  approximate	  tax	  policy	  gap	  estimate	  can	  
be	  prepared.	  Overall	  tax	  yields	  by	  EU	  member	  state,	  tanked	  from	  highest	  to	  lowest	  are	  as	  follows:	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Table	  12	  –	  EU	  member	  states	  overall	  tax	  yields	  
	  
	  	   	  	   Tax	  yield	  
	  	   	  	   %	  
1	   Denmark	   46.5%	  
2	   France	   45.6%	  
3	   Belgium	   45.2%	  
4	   Finland	   43.9%	  
5	   Austria	   43.2%	  
6	   Sweden	   43.1%	  
7	   Italy	   43.0%	  
8	   Hungary	   38.8%	  
9	   Germany	   38.4%	  
10	   Netherlands	   37.4%	  
11	   Luxembourg	   37.2%	  
12	   Croatia	   37.1%	  
13	   Slovenia	   36.6%	  
14	   Greece	   36.6%	  
15	   Portugal	   34.4%	  
16	  
Czech	  
Republic	   34.0%	  
17	   Estonia	   33.7%	  
18	   Spain	   33.7%	  
19	   Cyprus	   33.2%	  
20	  
United	  
Kingdom	   33.1%	  
21	   Poland	   32.4%	  
22	   Malta	   32.1%	  
23	  
Slovak	  
Republic	   32.1%	  
24	   Latvia	   30.1%	  
25	   Bulgaria	   29.1%	  
26	   Lithuania	   28.9%	  
27	   Romania	   28.0%	  
28	   Ireland	   23.4%	  
	  	   	  	   36.1%	  
	  
Source:	  Eurostat	  for	  2015	  
	  
The	  average	  yield	  for	  the	  top	  seven	  states	  is	  44.4%.	  Assuming	  other	  states	  could	  collect	  this	  yield	  
then	  the	  tax	  policy	  gap	  might	  be:	  
	  








	  	   %	   €'bn	  
Austria	   0.0%	   0.0	  
Belgium	   0.0%	   0.0	  
Bulgaria	   13.9%	   6.9	  
Croatia	   5.9%	   3.2	  
Cyprus	   9.8%	   2.0	  
Czech	  
Republic	   9.0%	   17.4	  
Denmark	   0.0%	   0.0	  
Estonia	   9.3%	   2.2	  
Finland	   0.0%	   0.0	  
France	   0.0%	   0.0	  
Germany	   4.6%	   181.3	  
Greece	   6.4%	   13.7	  
Hungary	   4.2%	   6.2	  
Ireland	   19.6%	   54.9	  
Italy	   0.0%	   0.0	  
Latvia	   12.9%	   3.5	  
Lithuania	   14.1%	   5.8	  
Luxembourg	   5.8%	   3.7	  
Malta	   10.9%	   1.2	  
Netherlands	   5.6%	   47.5	  
Poland	   10.6%	   51.4	  
Portugal	   8.6%	   17.9	  
Romania	   15.0%	   26.2	  
Slovak	  
Republic	   10.9%	   9.7	  
Slovenia	   6.4%	   3.0	  
Spain	   9.3%	   115.1	  
Sweden	   0.0%	   0.0	  
United	  
Kingdom	   9.9%	   292.9	  
	  	   	  	   865.7	  
	  
Sources:	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  text	  and	  authors’	  calculations	  
	  
The	  estimate	  is,	  of	  course,	  no	  more	  than	  that	  but	  it	  does	  indicate	  the	  scope	  that	  many	  states	  have	  
with	  regard	  to	  potential	  change	  of	  taxation	  policy.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  overall	  the	  sum	  is	  of	  the	  
same	  broad	  scale	  as	  the	  estimated	  tax	  compliance	  gap.	  
	  
9. Tax	  authority	  efficiency	  
Having	  noted	  the	  considerable	  data	  problems	  that	  we	  faced	  when	  undertaking	  this	  work,	  and	  the	  
resulting	  estimates	  of	  one	  aspect	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  that	  was	  estimated	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  addressing	  
those	  data	  issues,	  it	  appropriate	  to	  return	  to	  the	  core	  theme	  of	  this	  paper,	  which	  is	  an	  appraisal	  of	  
the	  efficiency,	  or	  otherwise,	  of	  EU	  tax	  administrations.	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For	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  data	  that	  follows	  the	  year	  2015	  is	  being	  considered.	  Data	  on	  tax	  authority	  
resources	  comes	  from	  the	  OECD	  (2017)	  and	  data	  on	  taxes	  paid	  from	  Eurostat	  (2018)	  unless	  
otherwise	  noted.	  GDP	  data	  is	  also	  from	  Eurostat.	  A	  survey	  of	  EU	  tax	  administrations	  undertaken	  by	  
the	  Tax	  Justice	  Network	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2018	  to	  extend	  the	  OECD	  research	  into	  areas	  where	  it	  was	  
felt	  that	  additional	  data	  might	  be	  of	  use	  apparently	  yielded	  replies	  from	  just	  six	  jurisdictions.	  The	  
prospects	  of	  securing	  any	  useful	  information	  to	  add	  to	  that	  secured	  by	  the	  OECD	  is,	  then	  considered	  
to	  be	  remote.	  No	  other	  publicly,	  available	  survey	  data	  on	  either	  staff	  employed	  or	  the	  costs	  of	  tax	  
administrations	  has	  been	  identified.	  
	  
Tax	  gap	  estimates	  are	  based	  on	  an	  average	  of	  the	  two	  estimates	  previously	  estimated	  in	  this	  paper	  
to	  allow	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  GDP	  estimates	  include	  a	  partial	  estimate	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy,	  but	  
do	  not	  reflect	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  loss	  estimated	  for	  the	  reasons	  previously	  noted.	  Where	  other	  data	  is	  
used	  the	  source	  is	  noted.	  	  
	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  despite	  the	  extensive	  coverage	  of	  OECD	  data	  in	  some	  areas	  the	  failure	  to	  
indicate	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  and	  staffing	  to	  specific	  taxes	  means	  that	  the	  attempted	  
assessment	  of	  the	  efficiency	  of	  tax	  authorities	  can	  only	  effectively	  be	  undertaken	  at	  the	  level	  of	  all	  
taxes	  because	  the	  relative	  efficiency	  of	  any	  tax	  authority	  at	  collecting	  any	  particular	  tax	  can	  only	  be	  
guessed	  at	  without	  any	  data	  to	  indication	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  to	  activity	  within	  the	  authority	  
itself.	  This,	  in	  itself,	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  OECD,	  or	  the	  EU,	  should	  be	  seeking	  data	  on	  the	  allocation	  
of	  tax	  authority	  resources	  to	  enable	  this	  appraisal	  of	  resources	  to	  take	  place	  when	  undertaking	  
future	  surveys.	  
	  
This	  said,	  a	  number	  of	  assessments	  can	  be	  undertaken.	  Tax	  authority	  spending	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  






Source:	  OECD	  2017	  and	  author	  calculations	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Source:	  OECD	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  author	  calculations	  	  
	  







Source:	  OECD	  2017	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  







Source:	  OECD	  2017	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  
The	  unusual	  revenues	  of	  Luxembourg	  are	  notable.	  It	  is	  apparent	  that	  there	  are	  anomalies	  in	  the	  ratio	  
of	  yield	  to	  GDP	  as	  a	  result	  of	  what	  might	  be	  described	  as	  tax	  haven	  activity	  in	  other	  countries	  as	  well,	  







Source:	  OECD	  2017	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  widely	  reported	  that	  Irish	  GDP	  reporting	  has	  been	  distorted	  by	  the	  flow	  of	  corporate	  
profits	  through	  the	  country	  and	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  this	  data	  when	  tax	  collection	  per	  
capita	  appears	  consistent	  with	  its	  nearest	  neighbour,	  the	  UK.	  
	  







Source:	  OECD	  2017	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  
It	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  range	  of	  efficiency,	  based	  on	  this	  criterion,	  is	  wide.	  This	  is	  true	  if	  other	  
efficiency	  criteria	  are	  used.	  For	  example,	  tax	  collected	  per	  employee	  for	  those	  countries	  reporting	  







Source:	  OECD	  2017	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  
The	  apparent	  efficiency	  ratio	  varies	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  12.95:	  Denmark’s	  employees	  appearing	  to	  be	  that	  
much	  more	  efficient	  than	  those	  of	  Bulgaria.	  The	  perspective	  on	  this	  issue	  of	  employee	  productivity	  






Source:	  OECD	  2017	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  
The	  efficiency	  ratio	  now	  appears	  to	  be	  dramatically	  different:	  the	  difference	  is	  that	  Italy	  appears	  to	  
be	  2.86	  times	  more	  efficient	  than	  the	  Netherlands,	  assuming	  all	  other	  matters	  are	  equal.	  
	  
Clearly	  they	  are	  not.	  For	  example,	  business	  intensity	  varies	  per	  state.	  The	  number	  of	  incorporated	  
business	  per	  capita	  in	  EU	  member	  states	  varies	  widely	  (based	  on	  Eurostat	  data,	  which	  it	  should	  be	  
noted	  does	  not	  necessarily	  tie	  up	  with	  local	  source	  data	  or	  the	  reported	  number	  of	  such	  entities	  that	  






Source:	  OECD	  2017,	  Eurostat	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  







Source:	  OECD	  2017,	  Eurostat	  and	  author	  calculations	  	  
	  
It	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  explanation	  for	  these	  variances	  is	  not	  at	  all	  down	  to	  tax	  authority	  efficiency	  
alone:	  the	  issue	  in	  question	  also	  relates	  to	  spillovers	  from	  tax	  policy	  (Baker	  and	  Murphy	  2017)	  and	  
the	  state	  of	  the	  economy	  being	  addressed.	  
	  
The	  hypothesis	  that	  does	  seem	  important	  to	  test	  is,	  then,	  one	  where	  the	  available	  data	  might,	  
despite	  all	  the	  deficiencies	  noted	  in	  all	  its	  forms,	  indicate	  the	  existence	  of	  relationship	  s	  requiring	  
further	  investigation.	  These	  are	  the	  relationships	  between	  yield,	  spending,	  staffing	  and	  tax	  gaps.	  For	  
the	  purposes	  of	  the	  analyses	  that	  follow	  an	  average	  tax	  gap	  has	  been	  used,	  	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  following	  
table,	  which	  assumes	  that	  some	  of	  GDP	  reflects	  shadow	  economy	  estimates	  and	  some	  does	  not.	  It	  is	  
stressed	  that	  this	  is	  approximate,	  but	  since	  all	  the	  data	  used	  in	  these	  estimates	  appears	  to	  be	  of	  that	  
nature	  there	  is	  nothing	  exceptional	  about	  that	  fact.	  
	  



















tax	  gap	  %	  
of	  GDP	  
	  	   €'bn	   €'bn	   €'bn	   	  	  
Austria	   13.4	   12.3	   12.8	   3.7%	  
Belgium	   33.0	   27.8	   30.4	   7.4%	  
Bulgaria	   4.3	   3.2	   3.7	   8.3%	  
Croatia	   4.0	   3.0	   3.5	   8.0%	  
Cyprus	   1.8	   1.3	   1.5	   8.5%	  
Czech	  
Republic	   9.5	   8.1	   8.8	   5.2%	  
Denmark	   18.7	   16.2	   17.5	   6.4%	  
Estonia	   1.5	   1.2	   1.3	   6.6%	  
Finland	   11.4	   10.0	   10.7	   5.1%	  
France	   124.9	   110.9	   117.9	   5.4%	  
Germany	   132.1	   118.1	   125.1	   4.1%	  
Greece	   22.9	   16.8	   19.9	   11.3%	  
Hungary	   10.0	   8.1	   9.1	   8.2%	  
Ireland	   7.3	   6.5	   6.9	   2.6%	  
Italy	   216.3	   165.5	   190.9	   11.5%	  
Latvia	   1.9	   1.5	   1.7	   6.8%	  
Lithuania	   3.5	   2.6	   3.1	   8.2%	  
Luxembourg	   1.7	   1.5	   1.6	   3.1%	  
Malta	   1.0	   0.8	   0.9	   9.6%	  
Netherlands	   23.1	   21.2	   22.2	   3.2%	  
Poland	   38.9	   30.2	   34.5	   8.0%	  
Portugal	   12.0	   10.0	   11.0	   6.1%	  
Romania	   19.2	   13.2	   16.2	   10.1%	  
Slovak	  
Republic	   6.1	   4.7	   5.4	   6.8%	  
Slovenia	   2.9	   2.3	   2.6	   6.7%	  
Spain	   66.4	   53.5	   60.0	   5.6%	  
Sweden	   18.1	   15.6	   16.9	   3.8%	  
United	  
Kingdom	   91.9	   83.0	   87.5	   3.4%	  
	  	   897.6	   749.1	   823.4	   5.6%	  
	  
Sources:	  As	  noted	  in	  text	  and	  author	  estimates.	  	  
	  






Source:	  as	  noted	  in	  text	  and	  author	  calculations	  
	  
Note	  that	  a	  trend	  line	  has	  been	  added.	  However,	  if	  the	  outlier	  of	  the	  Netherlands,	  which	  spends	  
0.36%	  of	  its	  GDP	  on	  its	  tax	  authority,	  is	  removed	  from	  the	  data	  the	  trend	  line	  is	  completely	  flat.	  
There	  appear	  to	  be	  no	  meaningful	  relationships	  in	  this	  data.	  The	  spend	  that	  is	  made	  on	  a	  tax	  
authority	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  direct	  relationship	  with	  the	  tax	  gap	  that	  a	  country	  suffers.	  The	  
same	  conclusion	  is	  reached	  across	  the	  range	  of	  data	  investigated.	  	  
	  
10. Conclusions	  
What	  might	  be	  concluded	  from	  this	  review?	  
	  
Overall,	  the	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  basic	  hypothesis	  with	  which	  the	  work	  began,	  and	  which	  it	  sought	  
to	  test,	  that	  increasing	  in	  the	  spend	  on	  a	  domestic	  tax	  authority	  should	  increase	  the	  tax	  yield	  by	  
reducing	  the	  tax	  gap	  is	  not	  proven	  by	  the	  available	  data.	  No	  obvious	  statistical	  link	  exists.	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That	  said,	  what	  is	  apparent	  is	  that	  the	  data	  required	  to	  really	  appraise	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  tax	  
administrations	  in	  Europe	  is	  not	  readily	  available.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual	  tax	  
authorities,	  where	  the	  OECD	  has	  made	  progress	  (albeit	  incompletely)	  with	  regard	  to	  collecting	  
necessary	  data.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  at	  the	  level	  of	  recording	  tax	  actually	  collected	  by	  different	  jurisdictions,	  
where	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  considerable	  confusion	  in	  the	  available	  data.	  An	  enhanced	  effort	  to	  
collect	  information	  on	  tax	  collected,	  by	  tax,	  is	  required.	  In	  addition,	  the	  OECD’s	  work	  needs	  to	  
question	  the	  expenditure	  incurred	  by	  tax	  authorities	  with	  a	  focus	  upon	  determining	  the	  use	  of	  
available	  resources	  by	  tax.	  Unless	  this	  is	  done	  the	  cost	  of	  collecting	  each	  tax	  cannot	  be	  appraised	  but	  
this	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  essential	  prerequisite	  of	  an	  effective	  review	  of	  the	  tax	  administrations	  of	  
the	  European	  Union,	  which	  also	  appears	  central	  to	  the	  well	  being	  of	  all	  the	  state	  involved.	  
	  
In	  addition,	  available	  GDP	  data	  appears	  to	  not	  be	  good	  enough	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  appraisal.	  This	  
is	  because	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  insufficient	  official	  effort	  is	  being	  put	  into	  estimating	  the	  size	  of	  shadow	  
economies,	  and	  far	  too	  little	  discussion	  on	  this	  issue	  is	  taking	  place.	  As	  such	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
shadow	  economy	  is	  really	  reflected	  in	  GDP	  is	  largely	  unknown.	  Given	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  sector,	  
and	  the	  importance	  of	  GDP	  for	  the	  comparative	  appraisal	  of	  economies,	  this	  leaves	  what	  is	  
happening	  in	  this	  critical	  part	  of	  the	  economy	  beyond	  appraisal	  and	  so	  effective	  management.	  There	  
are	  few	  economies	  that	  can	  afford	  this	  neglect,	  which	  does,	  therefore,	  requires	  further	  explanation.	  	  
	  
Despite	  this,	  and	  perhaps	  rather	  surprisingly,	  there	  does	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  convergence	  within	  the	  
available	  data	  on	  the	  potential	  size	  of	  the	  shadow	  economy	  in	  EU	  member	  states	  and	  this	  has,	  in	  
turn,	  permitted	  the	  estimation	  of	  tax	  gaps	  for	  EU	  member	  states.	  Whilst	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  
trend	  in	  these	  tax	  gaps	  is	  mildly	  downward,	  and	  this	  is	  welcome,	  such	  is	  their	  remaining	  scale	  that	  
this	  issue	  deserves	  greater	  attention	  than	  it	  is	  receiving.	  It	  is	  also	  apparent	  that	  existing	  
methodologies	  can	  only	  capture	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  tax	  gaps	  that	  currently	  exist:	  better	  
methodologies	  are	  required	  to	  capture	  data	  on	  tax	  avoidance	  and	  tax	  bad	  debt	  as	  well	  as	  those	  parts	  
of	  the	  tax	  gap	  that	  inevitably	  arise	  outside	  those	  areas	  included	  in	  the	  measurement	  of	  GDP.	  Tax	  gap	  
appraisal	  will	  remain	  incomplete	  until	  this	  is	  done.	  
	  
Lastly,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly,	  what	  is	  clear	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  simple	  relationship	  that	  exists	  
between	  tax	  authorities	  spending,	  tax	  yield	  and	  the	  tax	  gap.	  The	  issue	  is	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  
that.	  What	  is	  apparent	  as	  a	  result	  is	  that	  if	  there	  is	  to	  be	  effective	  management	  of	  the	  tax	  gap	  what	  is	  
required	  is	  a	  different	  management	  approach	  to	  the	  appraisal	  of	  risk	  within	  tax	  systems	  and	  tax	  
authorities.	  It	  is	  suggested	  that	  a	  spillover	  approach	  of	  the	  type	  proposed	  by	  Baker	  and	  Murphy	  
(2017	  and	  forthcoming)	  is	  what	  is	  actually	  required	  to	  address	  this	  issue.	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